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Abstract 
 
Pension funds have lately emerged as an essential field of study in various disciplines 
within social sciences. Political economists, economic geographers and some social 
policy researchers have studied the role of pension funds very broadly for instance in 
context of labour market relations, economic development and financial systems. Yet 
comparative studies in social and public policy have for long studied pension funding 
mostly in respect to its role in pension systems and reforms, and to the effects of 
investment returns to the development of retirement income benefits. Whereas the 
comparative studies have mostly focused on the savings and ‘liability side’ (e.g. 
pension benefits) of pension funds, in this paper, we conduct a comparative analysis 
on the politics of ‘the asset side’. It is argued that the economic and social 
consequences of the usage of pension capital need to be understood as intrinsic parts 
of pension regimes that cannot be left outside classification of these regimes in social 
sciences. 
 
Our comparative analysis studies the historical regulative institutional development 
paths of pension fund investment governance in Finnish (TEL/TyEL) and Swedish 
(ATP/AP, PPM) first pillar, second tier pension systems. The time period of the 
analysis is from the establishment of these systems in late 1950s and early 1960s to 
the recent reforms of last few years. Both systems have developed so that the role of 
financier of national economy has decreased and the role of more global portfolio 
investor increased over time. We argue, however, that there have been very 
significant differences between the institutional development paths leading to the new 
investor roles. The Swedish model has included more paradigmatic qualitative 
changes in the whole pension regime whereas the changes in Finnish pension fund 
governance have been rather parametric and quantitative. The financial crisis of 
2007–08 has also illustrated some essential differences between the current systems. 
 
Keywords: Finland, governance, institutional change, pension funds, Sweden 
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Introduction 
 
 
Capital derived from statutory and voluntary pension arrangements has played a role 
of utmost importance in the development of capitalist national economies and of 
global finance. It is the largest single block of financial capital invested in the global 
financial markets and the influence of today’s massive pension funds1 is being felt in 
every single capital market in the world. Financial markets have become dependent 
on pension fund investments as much as pension provision in various countries has 
become dependent on the performance of the same markets (Clark 2000). Pension 
funds revolutionized the entire domain of Anglo-American finance in the 1970s 
(Clowes 2000, Drucker 1976) and now continue to steer the direction of mainstream 
financial activities globally (Davis 2002, Davis & Steil 2001). They not only spread 
financial innovation but are also vital actors in changing the business models in the 
domain of finance (Ambachtsheer 2007). Pension funds now promote reform 
pressures towards their investee firms (Clark & Wójcik 2007) and seek increased 
control over firm-level decision making in the name of long-term shareholder value in 
such a scale that it could be even described as an emergence of a new development 
stage in capitalism, which belongs to ‘pension funds that mediate beneficiaries’ future 
claims against the actions of firms today’ (Clark & Hebb 2004). In brief, we are 
witnessing an era of ‘pension fund capitalism’ (Clark 2000), in which pension power, 
the ability to affect and change social realities through investment actions (e.g. 
Hayden 1989), is an essential transformative force. 
                                                
1 By ‘pension funds’ we are not only referring to the specific Anglo-American-Dutch legal entities 
called and organisational forms of pension funds in this paper, but to various different kinds of 
institutional arrangements meant to use assets by making financial investments covering pension 
benefit liabilities. 
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There has been much debate on pension funds and investments in various disciplines 
within social sciences such as economic geography, political economy, economics, 
sociology, and public policy. For example, there have been many critical debates on 
the general societal role of pension funds in terms from ‘pension fund capitalism’ and 
‘pension fund socialism’ (Langley 2008), the failures of the domain of finance in 
pension provision (Blackburn 2003, 2006a, 2006b), their historical significance in 
inflating capital markets and in disturbing real economy in the long term (Toporowski 
2000), and their various effects on states, solidarity and numerous other more specific 
themes especially in Clark’s (e.g. 2000, 2003) works. Although focus on European 
pension investments has raised much interest lately (see e.g. Clark 2003, Clark & 
Wójcik 2007, Engelen 2003, Dixon & Sorsa 2009), the mainstream literature on 
pension funds is focused on quite specific questions concerning pension funds that are 
Anglo-American in their institutional location and organisational form. For instance, 
Anglo-American pension fund investment management has gained much focus in 
terms of fund governance (Ambachtsheer 2007, Clark 2004, Boeri, Bovenberg et al. 
2006, Clark & Urwin 2008b, Cocco & Volpin 2005), pension fund investment 
regulation and changes of interest in it in the formal-political system (Clowes 2000, 
Clark & Wójcik 2007, Roe 2006, Langbein 1997), more general habits, rules and 
norms framing and resources available to fund governance and decision-making 
practices (Clark 2000, Clark & Urwin 2008a), investment decision-making (Clark, 
Caerlewy-Smith et al. 2006, Clark & Strauss 2007, Mitchell & Utkus 2004), and fund 
investments’ general effects on corporate governance (Clark & Hebb 2004, 2005, 
Clark & Wójcik 2007, Gillan & Stark 2003, Del Guercio & Hawkins 1999, Hawley & 
Williams 2005, Hebb 2006).  
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Yet, despite this increasing interest in pension funds in the social sciences, the topic 
has gained very little attention in social policy. In social policy in general and in 
European social policy in particular the interest in pension investments has been 
almost missing (see next section) although most European countries have introduced 
elements of funding even to their statutory systems (Immergut, Anderson et al. 2007, 
Vidlund 2006). For social policy analysis, the usage of pension savings capital has 
been regarded as programmes that provide income retirement benefits or at best 
buffers for pension financing. Who gets to control these savings, how the control of 
these savings is arranged, and what are the aims and outcomes of investments have 
not been important questions in the debate. In brief, comparative social policy studies 
have by and large focused on the ‘liability side’ (e.g. social functions, pension 
benefits, fund ownership) of pension funds. We argue that while it remains essential 
for social policy to focus on benefit delivery, these studies should be complemented 
and completed with an analysis on pension fund investment-making – the ‘asset side’ 
of pension provision. Indeed, funded, partially funded or prefunded pension systems 
are not only about generating returns to improve old-age pension benefits or to 
decrease pension costs. They are equally much about financial pension power: about 
generating vast pools of capital that can be used in various different ways to achieve 
different kinds of policy targets. We argue it is at best arbitrary and at worst 
inconsistent to focus on liabilities and put assets aside when studying and especially 
classifying pension systems and histories in social sciences. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to fill some of this gap by providing better tools for 
understanding on what kinds of social, financial and economic purposes and with 
what kinds of means and mechanisms pension assets generated by pension schemes 
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are managed. Or, what pension fund governance is and how it changes over time in 
specific institutional environments. Although there has been some interest towards 
this topic in social sciences, Monk (2009) argues that the attention has been ‘scant’. 
We argue that social policy as a discipline can offer many theoretical tools for making 
this attention broader and more complete. 
 
In the next two sections of the paper we discuss our theoretical framework including 
elements from governance studies and historical institutionalism in social policy and, 
in order to further increase the analytical depth, from more nuanced institutionalist 
perspectives of sociological institutionalism. We adopt a comparative perspective in 
order to disclose nuanced differences in the development of governance in different 
institutional regimes. We have chosen two sample cases. Our analysis is focused on 
the development paths of investment governance in Swedish ATP/AP/PPM and 
Finnish TEL/TyEL, both mandatory earnings-related pension schemes. The time 
period of the analysis reaches from the establishment of these systems in late 1950s 
and early 1960s to the recent reforms of last few years. 
 
We have selected these two countries because they have been traditionally classified 
under the very same variety of capitalism (mixed but primarily coordinated market 
economies) and welfare regimes (social democratic, Nordic). Moreover, the funds 
accumulated by the legislated pension schemes are relatively massive in these two 
small economies – especially in Finland where the second pillar pensions play little 
role – and the investment policy is of the utmost importance not only for safeguarding 
future pensions but also in, if not ‘helping the national economy operate smoothly’ 
(Kangas 2006), at least avoiding economic dysfunctions. Although some benefit 
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levels2, pension system parameters such as relative importance of pillars and tiers, and 
individual pension scheme administration features are somewhat different, these 
countries still look quite similar from the social policy paradigm and human 
development perspective in the beginning of the 21st century. But time and history are 
interesting factors between these two countries. Take financial history: Sweden is a 
former European superpower with wealth and much financial resources available in 
different points of history, whereas Finland, a part of Sweden until the very beginning 
of 19th century, remained at least until 1960s a poor country – best classified as 
developing country (Niemelä & Salminen 1999) – with a major lack of capital. More 
recently, these countries have also chosen very different kinds of development 
strategies in their pension regimes.3 These two countries present an interesting 
example of similarity in many aspects such as welfare state-building and of 
differences in history of economic development and pension reform at the same time. 
We argue that if relevant differences in investment governance over time can be 
found, it is essential for the academic community to critically re-evaluate the 
conceptions favouring regime similarity.  
 
We start the paper with a section discussing the missing agenda of pension fund 
governance in social policy. In the two following sections, we introduce our 
institutionalist theoretical framework and methodology, and the methods and data 
used in the study. The three proceeding sections are dedicated to the comparative 
                                                
2 Finnish pension regime has been sometimes considered an exception within the social democrat 
welfare regime due to lower compensation rates. 
3 The starting point was different as well. The Finnish pension regime development until 1990s 
resembled much more the Danish development starting from first and second pillar pensions than the 
Swedish path starting from first pillar pensions (for the modernization process of Finnish social 
security from a comparative perspective, see also Niemelä & Salminen 1999, Niemelä, Salminen et al. 
1993). 
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analysis of Finnish and Swedish pension fund governance. The first section presents 
the early institutionalisation of pension investors and asset management. The second 
discusses the development of investment methods and their institutional environment 
from the early years to the major shifts in investment paradigm in the 1990s and 
2000s, which is the topic of the third section. The last section of the paper is dedicated 
to conclusions drawn from our enquiry. 
 
 
Pension fund governance and pension regimes 
 
 
The examination of pension reforms in the mainstream comparative social policy 
literature has highlighted the changes across various institutional features of the 
pension systems such as eligibility rules, indexation, replacement levels, funding, 
payment but also the introduction of new (usually private) pension funded schemes 
(e.g. Immergut, Anderson et al. 2007, Vidlund 2006, Bonoli 2003, Ebbinghaus 2006, 
Hinrichs & Kangas 2003, Schmähl 2007). Despite the fact that social policy accounts 
for the changes in terms of introducing or changing funding and its role in pension 
programmes, the debates are concentrated on the impact that these changes will have 
for retirement income and whether they remain adequate or able to meet their social 
policy targets. The definition of these targets and their rationale is vital in our 
understanding on pension regimes. For example, Esping-Andersen (1990) famously 
compared the ability of the various pension systems in providing substantial 
retirement income and categorised welfare states according to their de-
commodification levels. Within his classification, the Scandinavian welfare states 
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topped the levels and were regarded as ‘universalist’, providing generous replacement 
levels on the basis of citizenship. 
 
The theory of welfare regimes has provided a legacy of undermining pension 
investments as a fundamental variable in classifying pension regimes. For example, in 
one recent study (Soede & Vrooman 2008), the existence of funding was considered 
one among the 34 quantitative and qualitative variables for analysing the variation of 
the mandatory parts of pension systems without any focus on how massive assets 
generated by the regimes were used. While there have been several critiques on 
Esping-Andersen’s classification and several authors have provided alternative 
welfare state typologies (Bonoli 2001, Castles 1993, Ferrera 1996) only few scholars 
have highlighted the importance of creation of ‘capital-actors’ in developing pension 
programmes (for exceptions, see Swenson 2002, Mares 2003). Yet, none of the 
aforementioned studies have considered that pension programmes do not merely 
represent pools of savings or financial capital but a substantial capital that allows 
funds to become important economic actors whose actions can potentially affect the 
original typology.  
 
But how exactly could we theorise this ‘asset side’ of pension regimes in social 
policy? One possibility is to adopt a top-down theoretical perspective. For example, 
one could to try to link debates on varieties of capitalism (VoC) to the welfare regime 
debates discussed above. The VoC literature suggests that pension funding is always 
embedded in a broader financial system with its various characteristics (see Clark 
2003) in which pension assets exemplify a variation of investment strategies and 
allocation of savings (Jackson & Vitols 2001). Traditionally, continental European 
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and Anglo-American financial systems are distinguished as ‘bank-based’ and 
‘market-based’, respectively (Zysman 1982).  The distinction is integral to the VoC 
literature since Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) supposedly benefit from 
patient, long-term and low risk financial capital investments, while Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) benefit from short-term and high-risk capital investments. 
 
The ‘VoC argument’ is based on two key assumptions. First, in both CMEs and 
LMEs there is an institutional complementarity4 between functionally distinct 
domains that reinforce and exhibit the advantages and disadvantages of each ideal 
type, rendering these combinations efficient. The second key assumption underlying 
the argument is that this institutional complementarity reinforces the functions of each 
type and thus is resistant to change (Longstreth 2006). In our case, the VoC argument 
would suggest that CMEs are less likely to shift towards a market-based Anglo-
American style of channelling and management of pension savings with short-term 
perspectives and high risks, and rely more on long-term investment capital. The 
management of pension funds is not only expected to meet the requirements of the 
institutionally complementary domains but any possibility of path departure would be 
constrained due to legacies in governance and investment horizon. 
 
The combination of two such broad theoretical debates is of little analytical value 
unless elaborated in detail. We can, for example, simply take social policy objectives 
and institutions in which they are embedded in welfare regimes as parts to the 
institutional complementarity framework. But, to mention a few theoretical puzzles, 
                                                
4 For a discussion on the notion of institutional complementarity, see Socio-Economic Review issue 3, 
2005 
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how could we address highly diverse and complicated relations between the 
institutional complementarity systems and what kinds of hypotheses could we draw 
on the relationships between the two frameworks? Although we recognize it is 
possible to criticise both theoretical debates for their shortcomings or questionable 
assumptions5, we find the lack of rigorous methods and methodology a fundamental 
obstacle for a top-down inquiry in which these two debates are combined. In other 
words, we need inductive research results on hypotheses and complementarities 
before such a task to be done. In this sense, one goal of our work is to bring new 
hypotheses for VoC and welfare regime debates to test. 
 
Yet, it must be noted that our research questions have been affected by these two 
theoretical legacies. As Hall and Soskice (2001) highlighted, in ‘the sphere of social 
policy, the varieties of capitalism approach is helping to open up several new research 
agendas’ (p. 51). In order to find solutions for our research question, we compare the 
similarities and differences between two welfare regimes and market economies that 
are usually categorised within similar groupings, Social-Democratic and CME. As our 
analysis shows, institutional complementarities can be assembled in very different 
manners and developments are not necessarily related to static regime 
complementarities but to more dynamic transitional and transnational processes. 
Indeed, institutional changes in European pension funding have in general presented 
both continuity and change that are not necessarily located in those institutional 
settings (e.g. pension benefit schemes) to which complementarity is supposedly 
                                                
5 The VoC argument is, to mention just few issues, providing many questionable assumptions on 
dynamics of asset management which in Anglo-American economies is hardly allocated (McGill, 
Brown et al. 2005) and governed in an innovative manner (Ambachtsheer 2007, Ambachtsheer, 
Capelle et al. 2008), and whose investment time perspectives and targets vary very significantly (Clark 
2000, Clark, Hebb 2004) from the stereotypical assumptions. 
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attributed in VoC or pension and welfare regime classifications (Dixon & Sorsa 
2009).  
 
In contrast to existing debates on pension regimes and varieties of capitalism we 
adopt a more inductive and actor-based approach to governance. We use the term as 
an analytical concept and tool as discussed and developed by Carmel and 
Papadopoulos (2003). Here, governance includes two analytically distinct yet 
theoretically paired aspects of formal (heuristically: what is to be governed) and 
operational governance (how is it to be governed). The formal aspect recognises what 
is the object of governance, in our case pension savings turned assets (e.g. as 
independent financial investors, as insurance companies, as nationally steered 
financing projects, as passive buffers for the pension scheme) and how different 
subjects (e.g. unions, employers, financiers, state actors) have been and are able to 
determine this object of governance. The operational aspect captures the means (e.g. 
investment decision-making arrangements and who participates in them, direct 
regulative restrictions and rules concerning allocations, risk management etc.) with 
which investments are steered. In order to address the methods of steering we use so-
called new institutional theory highlighting regulative, normative and discursive 
aspects of power (see next section).   
 
Our approach avoids assuming too much about pension assets and their investments, 
and provides a rather inductive account on the rationale of pension investments in 
different political economies rather than try to set them in a broad theoretical context 
at once. This paper is thus about the meso-level social and political foundations of 
institutional investments and, more generally, of modern finance. However, in order 
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to be able to recognize investments (unless they are explicitly mentioned as such in 
the data), we need some heuristic definitions for the research object. Here, we are 
looking at the usage of assets. Assets – literally in accountancy terms – refers here to 
the specific legally defined actors with particular financial capabilities generated by 
the statutory pension system design. Usage refers to the ways in which these assets 
are vested in different targets and transformed to different kinds of monetary flows 
and ownerships of financial instruments. Although our data does not include 
particular pension fund books and accounts, we find this accountancy-inspired 
demarcation very useful, since it very effectively leaves pension benefits and other 
already well-documented liabilities outside governance analysis unless they have 
direct effects on the assets or their usage. 
 
 
 
Historical Institutionalism, Governance and 
Institutional Change 
 
 
The point of departure for institutionalist thinking is that all actions, individual and 
collective, are embedded in institutional forms: social structures that have reached a 
high degree of elasticity and resilience, and that constitute, enable and constrain 
actors’ courses of action (Scott 2008). Institutions are elastic social structures that 
determine what expressions and directions actions driven by actors’ interests, also 
affected by institutions, will and may take (Swedberg 2003). They are heuristically 
located in the institutional environment – the community-wide informal conventions, 
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customs, norms, and social routines, and the formal structures of rules and regulations 
which constrain and control behaviour – and in the institutional arrangements – the 
particular, governed organizational forms such as markets, firms, labour unions, 
regulatory agencies, pension funds that arise from the institutional environment 
(Martin 2002).  Institutional structures and dynamics are not determined functionally 
but are relatively autonomous (i.e. they have their own ‘laws of motion’) – but neither 
are the patterns of economic behaviour exclusively determined by institutional rules 
nor can they be predictably manipulated through institutional change (Peck 2000). 
Institutions can be summarised as ‘residues of conflict and structurations of power’ 
(Korpi 2001). 
 
There have been three quite separate traditions in institutionalist thinking: historical 
institutionalism (of public and social policy), rational choice institutionalism (of 
economics), and sociological institutionalism (of organisation theory and agency 
theory) (see e.g. Martin 2002, Campbell 2004, Scott 2008). Our research setting that 
is focused on changes in policies and governance fits well in historical 
institutionalism, but in order to improve the ontological depth of the argument, we use 
a theory of different types of institutions primarily used in sociological 
institutionalism and organisation theory. We adopt a historical institutionalist 
framework in order to account for development paths of governance and to enable 
comparative study in a time- and event-sensitive institutional change perspective to 
institutional forms, but we also want to highlight the importance of agents, individual 
actions and change processes by adopting more nuanced ontological approach to 
institutions as matters of agency. Indeed, the current institutional theory puts very 
much weight on individual actions, actors and their decisions made. Most current 
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institutionalist thinking suggests that actors ‘make use’ of institutions differently, they 
can choose to act otherwise, and to follow one institution instead of another (see e.g. 
Crouch, Streeck et al. 2007). Institutions are created, renewed and maintained only by 
actions based on institutional forms. For example, a law is only a law (i.e. institutional 
form), not an institution if nobody acts according to that law. One cannot read a 
regulative institution from the letter of law and the question of what is ‘according to 
the law’ fully depends on the usages of the form in institutional sense. 
 
Recall the three issues needed for our analysis. In terms of structure, for Scott (2008), 
institutions ‘are comprised of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements 
that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life’. We follow Heiskala (2007), for whom these elements or don’t appear 
as pillars but different types of institutional forms according to their vocabulary and to 
the logic of their enforcement. The broader model of explanation always includes the 
narrower one, but they can be differentiated in analysis if it has analytical value, 
which is often the case (see Gronow 2008). The types can be heuristically summarised 
as follows (e.g. Scott 2008, Gronow 2008, Hodgson 2006).  
 
The regulative view concentrates on legally sanctioned and other typically formal 
rules, which coerce individuals to behave in line with institutional ends because 
compliance is instrumentally rational (e.g. are not sanctioned, provides incentives) for 
actors. Regulative institutions include coercive power and sanction non-compliance, 
but they also give a mandate for the compliant no one can legally contest, essentially 
this regulative view embraces institutions as the  ‘rules of the game’ (see North 1990). 
Laws are a paramount example of regulative institutional forms. Normative theorists, 
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classic sociologists in essence, argue that purely instrumental rationality is not 
applicable whenever internalised moral issues enter the picture. These norms – 
expectations, values, duties and other normative things explicated to the actor or 
internalised in socialisation processes – weigh on actors as moral obligations that have 
to be fulfilled. Normative institutions rely on moral obligation. Expectations and 
authority systems are institutional forms, but they become institutions only when 
actors internalise them and really do act accordingly to the obligation implied. 
Cultural-cognitive or discursive6 theorists, often inspired by phenomenology, propose 
that even moral obligations are just one set of cultural schema, and emphasize the 
nature of institutions as knowledge schemas that are common beliefs about the nature 
of social roles and situations. The mechanism behind these institutions is mimesis, i.e. 
actors act in certain ways because these ways promote some understanding of the 
world and make actions understandable. In discursive institutions, power is a more 
complex matter and they represent categories, typologies, schema and scripts. Put 
simply, it is about power of determining what is possible in speech acts. 
 
We acknowledge that the account of the institutional theories discussed here is not 
exhaustive (see Gronow 2008 for discussion and review), but it suits our purpose 
because it can address different types of power – the second issue – present in 
different types of institutions and institutional forms. Moreover, we regard 
governance as attempts to build or change institutions as such, not merely to create 
new institutional forms such as laws, policies, or discourses external to targeted actors 
but also to use power to get agents to act accordingly. Yet it must be noticed that our 
                                                
6 Gronow (Gronow 2008) has re-titled cultural-cognitive institutions as discursive institutions because 
cultural-cognitive institutions are not only based on knowledge or ‘culture’ in sense of a given system 
of meanings and their relations, but they are in nature discursively reproduced reciprocal typifications 
and typified knowledge rather than just any simply given typification or any piece of knowledge. 
17 
research question is one of (social) policy, which is why we are not looking at bottom-
up changes in investment practices. The policy perspective implies that we study the 
three kinds of institutional forms that define pension assets by constituting, enabling 
and constraining actions, and the governance perspective the attempts to enforce, 
dismantle and change them both as the operational steering of the actors and as the 
formal governance defining agencies. Furthermore, the institutional change 
perspective implies that we are definitely interested in the outcomes that serve as the 
criteria for successful policy change. 
 
Here, we come to the third issue: change. Institutions simply change if institutional 
forms or their usage changes. But why exactly do institutions born and change, what 
are the change processes like, and who is able to produce new forms and usages? 
Historical institutionalism currently emphasises the role of politics in time and the 
importance of sequence and feedback processes. Yet, the early advocates of historical 
institutionalism tended to regard change as somewhat external to their analytical 
schema. Actors were mostly able to provoke slowly moving, incremental change that 
would have to be triggered through times of crisis or critical junctures (Pierson 2000, 
Ebbinghaus 2005). Rather than focusing on institutional continuity (Pierson & 
Skocpol 2002), the late historical institutionalism focuses on the issue of institutional 
change with authors such as (Hacker 2004). Streeck and Thelen (2005) attempted to 
provide a theoretical framework that allows the explanation of institutional change so 
that it is neither restricted to external pressures nor slow in movement. While not 
dismissing the effects of exogenous pressure, the late historical institutionalism 
literature highlights that change can also be provoked internally through political 
contestation. Instead of highlighting actors and structures independent from each 
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other, Streeck and Thelen argue that actors’ conduct is conditioned by the institutional 
framework but at they same time they seek ways to circumvent or subvert the 
institutional rules according to their interests. As those using the concept of 
‘institutional work’ (Lawrence, Suddaby et al. 2009) would add, these 
circumventions, subversions and all actions aiming at creating, maintaining and 
disrupting may be an intrinsic part of the institutional framework as such. 
 
In the version of historical institutionalism used in this paper, institutional legacies are 
a central feature in structuration of power asymmetries, but should not be understood 
as path dependent drivers that nurture inertia or stability but instead as actively 
reproducing power dynamics that either enable or constraint actors’ ability to mobilise 
resources and exercise power (Roumpakis 2009). Streeck and Thelen (2005) provide a 
typology on how institutional settings come to be changed: settings can receive 
additional components (layering), be redirected to new purposes (conversion), fail to 
catch up with emerging needs (drift), and break gradually down (exhaustion). But 
why is, for example, such change possible in one policy area or country rather than 
another? The reason this question seems to fundamental is that Thelen and Streeck do 
not adequately address the mechanisms of change although they provide a strong 
analytical device for finding rationales and objects of changes. Here, we use an actor-
based examination of the role of power, the power asymmetries among key actors, 
and their ability to trigger institutional change in terms of change processes by using 
the notions of ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ and mechanisms of institutional change 
discussed by Crouch (2005) and Campbell (2004, see also Crouch, Streeck et al. 2007 
for discussion).  
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Institutional entrepreneurs are the actors with most capabilities to affect their 
networks in introducing change in their actions. Their capability to innovate is much 
dependent on the location beyond the immediate institutional environment they 
operate in. If they have good ties, networks and contacts, and broad repertoire of ideas 
with which to work, they are more likely to cause institutional change. The 
governance approach in this paper suggests that actors with power asymmetries and 
different strategies are seen directly to attempt to shape the institutional contents of 
pension investments, but so that they strategically prioritise different aspects in their 
entrepreneurial efforts. Moreover, institutions themselves condition institutional 
change as different institutions vary in diffusion and path dependency. Diffusion 
denotes the social spread, both horizontally and in depth, of institutions without 
changes in content. The scope of diffusion indicates the relative strengths of different 
institutions. Path dependency refers to phenomena in which chosen path rewards 
more decisions to follow it than changing it (i.e. path departure) or, more generally 
speaking, in which institutions significantly constrain future choices with some other 
mechanisms than direct incentives, for example narrow discursive frames for 
cognitive reasoning that give power only to those in control of the frame. 
 
Campbell highlights two essential mechanisms for institutional change, in which 
recombination of different institutions and new ideas create new ones. Bricolage 
refers to situations in which actors combine and recombine existing institutional 
principles and practices thus making innovations either with substantial bricolage 
(instrumental recombination) or symbolic bricolage (reframing). Bricolage is the main 
mechanism that helps to understand why institutions both constrain and enable action. 
Whereas bricolage is the mechanism of combining existing and acknowledged 
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institutions, translation is the mechanism in which new ideas, when brought in actor’s 
knowledge, are enacted and combined with existing institutions. Translation is a 
complex phenomenon that requires careful empirical attention. It may include various 
mechanisms of and institutional interplays between different types of institutions.   
 
To sum up, we use the terminology of change introduced by Streeck and Thelen –
layering, conversion, drift, and exhaustion – in order to explain rationales and objects 
of policy, governance and institutional design in change. But we also pay close 
attention to the actual change processes by looking at how different kinds of 
institutional entrepreneurs produce changes to institutions in Campbell’s terms – 
bricolage and translation in change processes, diffusion and path dependence of 
institutions. We are looking at both these kinds of change processes in changes of 
regulative, normative and discursive institutional forms and their usage, but only in 
policy level implying that there must be an effort, explicit or documented, by some 
actors to change institutions.  
 
 
 
Methods and Data 
 
 
The data used in this enquiry consists of publicly available material on the two 
pension systems in English, Swedish or Finnish. The analysis of the period until 
1990s relies mostly on second hand information, primarily previous academic studies, 
whilst data on more recent developments includes pension system stakeholder (e.g. 
ministries, labour market organisations, interest groups) reports and documents, 
21 
material from fund websites, and preparatory committee reports on pension reforms 
on the period. We have used a snowball method in gathering this data, starting from 
basic descriptions and established academic studies of the systems and ending up with 
more detailed fund- or policy-specific documents. The Finnish pension system, 
pension politics and their relationship between the Finnish financial system are not 
only colorful and peculiar but also quite well-documented in Finnish and reasonably 
well summarized in English (Kangas 2006, fully in English:  Hinrichs, Kangas 2003, 
Niemelä 1994, Salminen 1987, Pentikäinen 1997, Varoma 1997, Kangas 2007, 
Hietaniemi, Ritola 2007). The same applies to the Swedish case – especially to the 
birth of ATP pension scheme and its various reforms, which have been one of the best 
documented policy reforms in the social policy literature (Esping-Andersen 1985, 
Korpi 1983, Heclo 1975, Baldwin 1990). The data on the recent Swedish pension 
reforms are drawn primarily from the annual reports that the AP funds have published 
during the last 7 years (2002-2008). The more recent Finnish data consists of various 
workgroup reports and government bills behind pension reforms (e.g. HE 241/1996 
1996, HE 255/1996 1996, Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä 
2006, Louekoski 2005, Rajaniemi 2007, Kausto 2002) 
 
Our method is best described a descriptive documentary analysis. However, we use 
some elements of content analysis, which increases sensitivity towards different types 
of data and different discursive understanding in each period of time. The standard 
process of content analysis consists of theorisation, conceptualisation, 
operationalisation, coding, sampling, reliability checking and reporting (Neuendorf 
2002). By using institutional theory, we are committed to looking at regulative, 
normative and discursive social practices and forms that each has different logics by 
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type from our data. The conceptualisation is made by looking at explicit expressions 
concerning pension investors, investments (as assets and their usage) and forms and 
practices of investment decision-making in this theoretical framework. In order to 
increase the inductive nature of the study, we aim at keeping operationalisation to 
minimum and to rely more on particular discursive contexts of material studied – in 
the data used usually very explicit and quite technical in nature. The coding and 
reporting of results is made by using the terminology of institutional change discussed 
in the previous section. Because we mostly rely on existing interpretations and 
historical narratives, we are not using sampling or reliability checking. 
 
We believe that by adopting this method, we can provide a valid descriptive 
understanding on institutional changes in pension fund governance in both countries 
studied. We recognize that our approach is by no means definitive in explanation. In 
case of institutional theory this would require interviews, observation or at minimum 
surveys; personal experiences and narratives that are impossible to conduct especially 
in case of the earliest periods of our enquiry. Thus it rather provides hypotheses to be 
further tested in empirical, theoretical and historical enquiry. It must be noted, 
however, that we are conducting a comparative analysis, which requires special 
attention to some issues. 
 
Firstly, our analysis is only partial, focused on the first pillar funds. We recognize that 
in order to conduct a full comparative analysis on the whole ‘regime of pension 
investments’, the privately controlled second-pillar funds in Sweden, other Finnish 
funds generated by mandatory schemes, and third pillar funds in both countries need 
to be taken into account in analysis. Furthermore, the two systems studied are not 
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fully commeasurable. Both schemes studied are first pillar, second-tier, mandatory, 
partially funded public pension systems. In functional terms, the Finnish funds studied 
manage only the assets generated by pension contributions concerning the most 
private sector employees whilst the Swedish funds manage assets generated by 
statutory contributions covering all employees and guaranteeing only minimum 
earnings-related pensions (there’s no benefit or contribution ceiling in the Finnish 
system). The funds are separate and independent from national budgets, although 
accounted in them in both countries.7 
 
The Finnish earnings-related pension system has been called a hybrid combining 
some elements of the Swedish model – basic pension security for all with earnings-
related benefits on top for those with an employment record – and the decentralised 
Central-European ‘corporatist model’ (Hinrichs, Kangas 2003). For heuristic purposes 
it could be argued that the second pillar of Swedish pension regime is mostly 
legislated in the first pillar in Finland. In contrast to Sweden, where varying employee 
needs and the ceiling in statutory pension levels generated a complex and fragmented 
system of supplementary pensions arrangements, the Finnish regime remained almost 
fully based on statutory pensions (Lundqvist 1998). In effect, there is almost only first 
and third pillar pension provision taking place in Finland, whilst second pillar 
provision based on nation-wide labour market agreements and covering 90–95 % of 
workforce is of great importance in Sweden. In brief, our analysis compares two sets 
of assets that cover mandatory liabilities not only for different groups of population 
but different in the nature of total pension provision as well. 
                                                
7 In Finnish case, there is an important reason for this, because the arrangement would otherwise be 
subject to EU regulations (most importantly life insurance directive), which were avoided due to 
negotiated special arrangement when Finland joined the EU in 1995. 
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The second issue is mutual influence. As the literature strongly points out, the birth of 
Finnish TEL system was heavily influenced by the birth of Swedish ATP system. For 
example, the employers’ associations communicated regularly and the Swedish 
employers’ negotiators sent letters on their experiences to their Finnish counterparts. 
In more general terms, Finland has been quite keen on following its Western 
neighbour in social policy and thus we must recognize these two development paths 
are not independent. However, this less applies to the different kinds of development 
paths of the two pension systems studied. Thus the comparative analysis provides an 
interesting question very specific to these two arrangements: why did Finland end up 
with so different kind of a scheme? Why did the Swedish influence vanish in 
earnings-related pension provision? And indeed, why did Sweden opt for 
paradigmatic reforms whilst Finland relied on parametric ones (Vidlund 2006, see 
Hinrichs, Kangas 2003)? We argue that the initial dependency between the two 
systems is not an obstacle for comparative analysis but rather an interesting variable 
providing even more grounds of comparative historical institutionalist analysis. 
 
 
  
The Birth and Institutionalisation of Pension Investors 
 
 
The introduction of the Swedish earnings-related pension system has been one of the 
best documented policy reforms in the social policy literature due to its importance in 
setting an encompassing pension model and exemplifying the power struggle between 
labour market organisations, Social Democrats and bourgeois parties (Korpi 1983, 
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Esping-Andersen 1985). This struggle was not only a battle over the issue of 
redistribution of the pension programme costs and benefits, but also an important 
struggle over the creation of publicly controlled pension funds. The flat-rate benefits 
provided by the Basic pension programme that was established in 1948 had to be 
reconsidered because it was not regarded as suitable to the 1960s socio-economic 
conditions. The birth of a new ATP programme was related to a change in discursive 
understanding over the economic role of pensions and to a drift in an old institutional 
arrangement. 
 
The pension reform was the main issue of the 1958 elections and it involved the 
mobilisation of power resources on behalf of both societal and market actors. Both 
Conservative and Liberal parties rejected the idea of a legislated pension scheme and 
favoured a voluntary scheme based on bargaining. The agrarians did not have any 
particular interest in the new scheme and their electoral power was in decline due to 
industrialisation.  In an effort to secure broad agreement between social groups, the 
central labour union (LO) proposals for the creation of an earnings-related scheme 
favoured white-collar employees (Esping-Andersen 1985).  The social democratic 
party (SAP) proposed a prefunded scheme, in which a ‘buffer pension fund’ was to be 
established via the collection of contributions exceeding the direct liabilities of the 
system in order to secure the input and output transfers of the system before the new 
ATP scheme would mature. The funds would accumulate assets that were to be 
invested in bonds after two years from its enactment. The response of the central 
employer association (SAF) was an organised counter-mobilisation that was 
electorally expressed through a coalition of bourgeois (e.g. Conservative and Liberal) 
parties. The previously divided bourgeois parties now formed a coalition and 
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managed to stop the legislation of the pension reform in 1958. As a response to the 
new political tension, SAP provoked elections. The results gave SAP only plurality 
but not majority in the parliament. With the political support of the Communist party 
and the defection of a working-class unionist of the Liberal Party, SAP managed to 
pass the law with one vote majority (Heclo 1974). Labour market disputes between 
LO and SAF were displaced by party politics and class mobilisation. 
 
The reform established funding, a new, non-local element to Swedish pension 
provision. The partial funding was primarily justified on grounds of intergenerational 
equity (i.e. lowering contributions at some point of time), but also with the possibility 
to answer to prevailing shortage of capital. It was also agreed that the schedule of 
contribution rates ‘should be reviewed and adjusted -- since it was not the main intent 
of the Riksdag to use the Fund as an instrument of forced saving’ (Daly 1981).The 
introduction of ATP also replaced some of the old private second-pillar arrangements. 
The institutional change that took place when ATP was born was a matter of layering 
and translation rather than replacement of old institutions with completely new ones 
when looked from the pension provision perspective. From asset perspective, 
however, it was completely a new institution. 
 
The formula proposed by SAP and later enacted was ‘national supplementary 
pensions scheme’ (Allmän Tilläggspension, ATP) that was financed solely by 
employers. The first tier of the Swedish first-pillar system remained a universal flat-
rate benefit (Flexiblare Pensioneringssystem, FP) funded by general taxation, and 
topped by the second-tier ATP scheme. The ATP pensions ‘were designed to offer 
compatible, if not better, pension benefits than the private sector’ (Blyth 2002). The 
earnings-related scheme was financed by the employer contributions, based on PAYG 
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system, and provided a DB scheme that covered almost 90% of the working 
population and offered a 66% replacement rate (Esping-Andersen 1985). Both 
schemes were indexed with the consumer price based index. The Basic pension 
scheme was financed by the employers (around 6%) and general revenues (2%) 
(Sundén 2000, Könberg, Palmer et al. 2000) whilst employers contributed 13% of 
wages to the earnings-related pension scheme. 
 
The organisational form of pension assets became a national foundation independent 
of the crown. However, The Pension Committee that had discussed different options 
‘was aware that the very size of the fund, if it were centrally controlled as a single 
unit, might cause it eventually to dominate the capital market’ (Daly 1981). The end 
solution was to divide the foundation to three funds each having their own Board of 
Directors (BoD). The AP1 received and administered contributions from local and 
national governments in their role as employers, including publicly owned 
corporations, while the AP2 handled the contributions from private employers with at 
least twenty employees. The third one, AP3, received and administered the 
contributions of self-employed persons, as well as contributions from firms with less 
than twenty employees. The control of the funds was based on normative agreement 
on that the BoDs would be tripartite, with board members from trade unions, 
employers and the ‘public interest’ (in form of members appointed by the central or 
local governments). The AP1 board consisted of three representatives from local 
governments, unions and employers while in AP2, unions and employers obtained 
each four seats with central government appointing only one (Pontusson 1992). In the 
AP3 fund board, unions had four seats, employers’ association one, small employers 
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three, and finally central government one. The three AP funds exemplified remarkable 
institutional continuity. 
 
However, the first pressures for change emerged from the radical demands of wage-
earners in the late 1960s. Yet the pressures did not change the already-existing funds 
but only created additional ones, the Fourth AP fund and the famous ATP-linked 
wage-earner funds that were meant to ‘complement the trade union solidarity wage 
policy, to increase employee influence over the economy and to counteract the degree 
of wealth concentration resulting from the private ownership and control of the forces 
of production’ but also representing a ‘”Kaleckian” “institutional accommodation to 
full employment’ by ensuring employees’ share in accumulation, thereby securing 
high profitability and investment through enhanced corporate liquidity and provision 
of additional risk capital’ (Whyman 2004). 
 
The Finnish statutory employment-related pension scheme for private-sector 
employees (TEL) was established a few years later in 1961 and enforced in 1962. 
There had been some relevant statutory pension arrangements, the most important 
being the national pension scheme from 1937 to 1956, and the dominant private 
earnings-related pension schemes, but new first-pillar basic pension scheme (1957) 
and TEL was meant to and replaced them effectively. The basic pension scheme, 
which changed prefunding into pure PAYG in 1957, was ‘a victory for and income 
transfer in favour of the agrarian population’ (Niemelä, Salminen 1999), whereas TEL 
‘began an era in which the labour market organizations were actively involved in the 
shaping of social policy and development of social security based on the insurance 
principle took centre stage’ (p. 42). Employees on short-term contracts (LEL) (1961), 
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farmers (1974), other self-employed (YEL) (1974) and artists (TaEL) (1986) later got 
their own separate mandatory programmes, and TEL, LEL and TaEL schemes were 
merged into one scheme (TyEL) as late as in 2007. The pension programmes for 
public employees (one for central government employees and one for municipal 
employees) that existed before TEL were not merged with TEL but remained separate 
entities. In this paper we are focused only on the TEL/TyEL funds in order to 
although we recognize earlier and other funds have been essential as well in Finnish 
economic development (see Kangas 2006 for more discussion). 
 
The TEL system design was based on four-year-long committee preparation, which 
included one ministry, one Social Security Institution (KELA), and six labour market 
organization (three employees’, two employers’ and one agrarian) representatives and 
three members of parliament from government-forming political parties. There were 
three initial main options for a new scheme: private provision with voluntary 
arrangements (a reform of the old scheme), mandatory centralized system executed by 
reformed KELA, and decentralized mandatory minimum scheme with possibility to 
provide additional pension. Although insurance companies were asked to help in 
drafting a new scheme, they refused to join the committee and deemed mandatory 
pension insurance 'impossible'. There was nearly a two-year stop in the committee 
operations due to dissent on financing arrangements and more general resistance by 
the employers towards statutory schemes. (Salminen 1987.). The final solution, the 
third option in the list, was finally accepted by the employers because of 
decentralization and private provision of otherwise mandatory pensions.  
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From a pension provision perspective, the birth of TEL was a matter of translating (by 
legal force) the new statutory variables to the existing company-based arrangements 
(Lundqvist 1998). But the interpretation is somewhat different from investment 
politics point of view. The employers wanted to ensure that the state has neither 
control over nor interest in decentralised fund investments or any other features than 
pension benefit levels and securing pension adequacy by regulation, not control. 
Whereas the Swedish labour union demands included universal pension and funding 
under public control (Esping-Andersen, Korpi 1984), the Finnish demands were very 
different in case of the latter option. In Sweden, LO had turned down the employer 
demands for decentralization primarily because it wanted to ensure the funds being 
available as public tools for economic policy. The employer opposition towards this 
solution was so stark in Finland that the main labour union SAK did not even 
seriously consider making the option an essential demand. The reason for the different 
outcome was not only that the labour unions were much weaker than their Swedish 
counterparts or that the political left was quite fragmented, but also that employers 
were convinced about their financial benefits from the decentralized system after 
quite carefully studying the Swedish reform (and the failure of employers there) and 
communicating with Swedish employer organisations (Salminen 1987).  
 
The committee report was turned into a parliament motion but not a government bill 
because the agrarian minority government wasn't willing to give one: they also left a 
minority report to the report. The bill was directly opposed only by the extreme left 
(SKDL), processed very fast (in two months), and put in effect as law in 1962. The 
funding element was based on broad consensus regarding shortage of financial 
resources as a primary obstacle for investments and job creation in the Finnish 
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economy, and high inflation a great incentive for borrowing, so time was politically 
ripe for creating large pools of capital (Pentikäinen 1997). The Finnish scheme was 
basically born a public-private-partnership. The statutory scheme was and is executed 
by competing private pension insurance companies (PICs, työeläkevakuutusyhtiö), 
company pension funds (eläkesäätiö), or industry-wide pension funds (eläkekassa) 
according to employer choice. Traditionally large companies have had their own 
pension funds, whilst most companies and almost all small companies have insured 
their employees through PICs (Puttonen, Torstila 2003). The TEL system in general 
halted the growth of pension funds, which provided pensions for twice as many 
employees as industry-wide funds and six times more than insurance companies 
during the 1950s (1997) 
 
There was an interesting political struggle in mid 1960s when the agrarian party tried 
to merge the TEL system with the basic pension provision scheme, creating a pension 
system fully in public control. But it was not the employers, previously very worried 
about taking funds under public control, but the workers who were outraged by this 
attempt and gave signals that were then interpreted as threats of general strike 
(Pentikäinen 1997, p. 90). The second pressure for change in Finnish pension fund 
governance emerged in early 1970s, which suggests that the institutionalisation of 
TEL funds to their elastic forms took a while longer than in Sweden that was however 
more prone to layering. In the so-called social partners' pension commission of 1971, 
the labour union SAK demanded that the parity principle (both labour market parties 
should have equal representation in all pension providers' administration) should be 
reached to all pension providers and that they should participate more in asset 
management. Although suffering from internal dissent, SAK demanded the automatic 
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premium lending system to be ceased because the funds were supposedly used to 
cover operating costs of companies rather than productive investments. It also urged 
company funds to be terminated and to increase the representation of labour unions in 
large pension insurance companies. In more general terms, SAK wanted to reform the 
Finnish earnings-related asset management regime more similar to Swedish regime. 
 
The issues were renegotiated in the general incomes policy settlement (TUPO, a 
tripartite economic policy-setting arena) of 1974. It was agreed by both labour market 
parties in the settlement that labour market party representation would be negotiated 
in coordination by Työeläkelaitosten liitto TELA (now Työeläkevakuuttajat), the 
pension provider interest group. Investment policies and principles were also to be 
discussed in advisory boards, both general (common lending commission LUNE) and 
provider-specific. From the beginning of 1975, each PIC ought to have four employer 
and four employee representatives in their supervisory boards (selecting the boards of 
directors), and two from each in the board of directors. (Salminen 1987.). In industry-
wide funds, the employers and employees could both nominate half of members of 
board, whilst in company funds the employers nominate two thirds of the members. 
This disparity was decreased by the requirement that in some fundamental issues (not 
including investment policy) decisions required five sixths majority of the votes. 
 
The main difference in the birth of the arrangements in the two countries was quite 
significant in terms of whose and what the assets generated were in normative and 
regulative terms. The difference in formal governance was a visible result of different 
conflicts in these two countries. In Finland, it was not simply a struggle between the 
right and the left with labour market organisations each taking their sides as in 
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Sweden, but for example between industry workers and agrarian population and 
within the left as well. The Finnish solution of relying on regulated corporate 
governance rather than public control and on multiple alternatives for privately owned 
provision rather than centralised public organisation was a major contrast to the 
Swedish solution. Whilst the former set the markets in parity presentation but 
employer control against politics, the latter set politics against markets, which served 
labour union interests very well. Both arrangements relied on normative agreements 
on having both labour market parties in fund administration. But Finland gave less 
power to social partners and excluded all government control, and the Swedish fund 
investments remained incredibly independent of political coups. What is most 
important is that both solutions were relatively stable in mandates for administration: 
diffused institutional paths of decision-making, which makes normative and 
discursive transformations concerning investment methods and tangible constraints 
for investment behaviour strong in explaining altering investment behaviour. In 
Swedish case, however, these transformations were more open for public political 
struggles – which indeed ended up first to layering and later to a drift – whilst the 
Finnish system that still exists constrained policy to investment boundary conditions. 
 
 
From National Finance to Financial Capitalism: 
Investment Methods, Allocations and Regulations 
from 1960s to 1990s 
 
 
The Swedish original pensions committee had discussed four broad investment 
strategy alternatives that can be called “the special destination”, “the banking 
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institution”, “the retroverse loan”, and “the bond market” models. According to the 
special destination alternative, funds were simply to be used for specific economic 
purposes, such as housing construction and power supply. For labour unions, 
however, the new collective savings instrument, the three AP funds, provided a 
unique opportunity to try both to compete in the credit market with the dominant 
banks (e.g. SEB and SHB banks) and to provide capital to companies – both 
externally through the banks and internally with corporate bond investments. In 1961, 
LO proposed that AP funds ought to be able to buy shares in order to compete in the 
supply of capital while making ‘sure that pension savings would be channelled to 
productive investments’ (Ryner 2002, authors’ emphasis). The rationale was to invest 
in the industry sector through a creation of funds that would manage the volume and 
the timing of the investments in the economic targets. Because the opposition parties 
and businesses were afraid that the fund would be used by the government to 
nationalize certain sectors of private industry ‘by the back door’, the two alternatives 
were dropped and the fund boards were prohibited from investing in equity shares 
(Swenson 2002, Daly 1981, Pontusson 1991). The banking option was dropped also 
because the funds were not intended to make large banks even more concentrated but 
rather to replace old financial structures based on insurance companies. 
 
Moreover, the AP funds were placed under many restrictions in investment choices 
and to follow the prudential standards of private insurance companies although being 
foundations. Although the extensive coverage of the ATP scheme rendered the 
interests of the insured similar to those of the ‘general public’, the means to serve 
these interests were very limited. In fact, they faced more investment constraints than 
insurance companies and essentially were enabled only investments that did not 
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provide them any kind voice over issues of corporate governance. The funds were 
prevented from purchasing equities or holding any direct power over corporate 
governance, mandated only to buy corporate and government bonds and to provide 
direct loans to public authorities (e.g. local governments) and intermediary credit 
institutions such as corporate and investment banks.  
 
The new pension investors in both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia shared the investment 
paradigm of ‘retroverse loans’, or, simply, premium lending. This refers to the 
mechanism with which employer-sponsors could borrow a part of their contributions, 
in Finland a formal employer right and more informal in Sweden. The economic 
benefit of the Finnish solution is that it is a flexible one, almost an automatic stabiliser 
in capital provision also lowering transaction costs: if the businesses don’t need credit 
at some point of time, the capital can be then invested elsewhere; if they do, they will 
get it automatically. In the Swedish AP funds, employers could borrow 50% of their 
previous annual contributions if banks provided guarantees for them. In 1975, 74% of 
the funds’ assets were in government bonds while  only 18% was directed to lending 
and promissory loans (see Pontusson 1992:83).  In the Finnish TEL funds, the 
premium lending was more extensive in popularity and more sophisticated in terms of 
financial innovation. The employer-sponsors could borrow two thirds of contributions 
as cheap loans with very little collateral. The interest rate for premium loans was 
fixed (at 5 %) for over three decades and was not made market-based until 2006. In 
contrast to Sweden, the Finnish TEL loans were not related to earlier contributions in 
cash: the pension providers received the contributions from employers annually in 
bonds instead of cash. The interest rate for the bond was the ministry-set technical 
provision rate, and the annual amortization seven percent of the remaining loan, 
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which implied that the maturity of the loan was in principle unlimited. The Finnish 
solution was far more innovative and, arguably, increased the employers’ trust 
towards the pension system in general. 
 
The Swedish funds did not initially follow specific investment plans other than 
maximising returns in bond investments. The allocation of investments obtained only 
secondary importance as long as the primary target of satisfactory returns was 
achieved The AP fund investments in government bonds were linked with the 
development of new housing constructions and especially with the launch of the 
‘Million program’. The program was aimed at delivering one million houses in a 
period of ten years (Esping–Andersen 1985, p. 188). With this initiative, private 
capital willing to invest in housing was simply ‘crowded out’ by public arrangements. 
The policy was considered ‘a priority’ (Meidner in Martin 1984), and was 
accompanied with the enhancement of local authorities’ power since they were 
responsible for the management of the new houses. Along with the construction of 
housing, the state invested in further social development such as the construction of 
hospitals and schools (LO 1963 cited in Pontusson 1992, p. 85). Table 1 provides an 
overall summary of the AP funds asset allocations in 1960-1988. As shown, the 
housing sector received the majority of AP lending. Employers borrowed more capital 
during the 1973 financial crisis and, interestingly, the right-wing bourgeois 
government coalition eleceted in 1978 used the AP funds to meet their budgetary 
requirements. 
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 Central 
government 
Local 
government 
 
Housing Business 
1960-65 10.3% 15.0% 42.4% 31.5% 
1966-71 8.4 8.4 50.7 32.4 
1972-77 22.0 6.9 35.1 46.1 
1978-82 42.3 3.4 28.6 25.3 
1983-88 23.6 -1.8 91.6 -15.8 
Table 1. Basic allocations of AP fund (lending as a percentage of total net lending) in 
1960-88. Adopted from Pontusson (1992, p. 85) 
 
 
Along with the expansion of pension funds’ size, the political significance of 
corporatist control over investment policy increased. Arne Geijer, the leader of the 
LO, was particularly interested in securing the ability of wage-earners to control their 
savings without any intermediation from the government. Despite employers’ initial 
hesitation, Geijer strategically aimed at a collaboration of SAF and LO for a ‘coup’ 
over the fund investments. LO was willing to maintain its promises for full 
employment and welfare state expansion, and not to threaten the foundations of the 
Swedish market economy (Pontusson 1987, Pontusson, Kuruvilla 1992). In fact, in 
order to dispel SAF fears, Geijer guaranteed that a part of the funds would be directed 
to industry (Swenson 2002, p. 289-292) and companies would never lose their 
eligibility to premium lending. Essentially the vast majority of the AP lending to 
companies took place through the purchase of corporate bonds and promissory notes 
while premium-lending remaining a rather weak mechanism for credit supply. In fact, 
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the supply of premium loans averaged only 4.0% of the total lending of the AP funds 
in 1969-72 and reached 9.3 % in 1977-80 (Pontuson 1992).  
 
The Swedish AP funds initially became a tool for maintaining the premises of the 
Swedish market economy – i.e. full employment, productivity growth and welfare 
state expansion – with profit-seeking capital, not a tool for controlling corporate 
activities. In other words, although much of the funds were channelled through the 
government budget, Sweden opted for one kind of ‘pension fund capitalism’ instead 
of ‘pension fund socialism’ (cf. Belfrage, Ryner 2009 forthcoming). In this kind of 
pension fund capitalism, funds were supposed not only to provide a national financing 
source for housing projects independent of national budget but also to transform the 
Swedish financial sector. Quite similarly, case Finland provides a history of one kind 
of pension fund capitalism: it is ‘an excellent example of how it was possible to unify 
social policy goals with the economic goals of building up modern industrial market 
economies’ (Kangas 2006). In contrast to Sweden, however, public scheme funding 
was nothing new in 1960s Finland. Pension funds related to the national pension 
system electrified and built the basic infrastructure for the country since the late 1930s 
and especially in the 1950s, although completely failed to provide sustainable pension 
security. Now, the rapid industrialization of the economy from the 1960s on was 
largely facilitated by TEL funds, and until the 1980s all Finnish pension funds were 
more or less deliberately used to promote the national economy.  
 
Premium lending was by far the most important investment vehicle for the TEL funds 
from the early 1960s all the way to mid 1990s, in the early years accounting for 80–
90% of investments in some portfolios. Because the system was based on legal 
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employer rights and automatic distribution of premium loans, the TEL providers 
could not simply opt for any investment strategy. All contributions and premium loan 
instalments didn't need to be used to pension payments, however, so a part of Finnish 
assets could be used to various other targets. The main non-premium-lending 
investment method was target-specific strategic allocation, whose goal was job 
creation and improvement of general employment rate according to public policy 
targets (Pentikäinen 1997), which was highly rational from the PAYG perspective. 
However, this goal was not related to a fixed path or specific industries, but dynamic.  
 
In PICs, which were the only providers making significant investments since the 
funds tended to keep the assets in the parent companies, the most important vehicles 
were 'investment loans', big loans to the biggest contributing companies, and some 
other investments like equity and housing (see Figure 1). In the 1970s and 1980s, 
about one-third of these investments were directed at industry. In addition to industry, 
PICs invested in the building sector (about 20 per cent) and directly to real estate 
(about 15 per cent) (Kangas 2006). The profits from real estate and building project 
investments remained low. However, as Pentikäinen (1997) argued, the maximisation 
of profits was never the goal for investments in any instruments in the first decades of 
TEL investments – a stark contrast to Swedish bond investments. 
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Figure 1. Total allocations (as a percentage of total portfolios) of all TEL provider 
investments by asset class in 1980–2008. Source: TELA 
 
 
It was mostly the popularity of the premium lending system that made other 
investments less common, since the funds initially had few Swedish-type blocked 
transactions or allocation ceilings.  However, there was an essential mechanism 
preventing all riskier investments. In contrast to Anglo-American funds, the 
accounting principles for TEL providers in general have been based on extensive risk 
management, which has been an important reason not to rely heavily on equity 
investments considered too volatile (Pentikäinen 1997). The regulation of PICs 
resembled the continental European style insurance regulation although the contents 
of this regulation were somewhat different (Lindqvist-Virtanen 2004). The capital 
reserve requirements for PICs established in 1969 gave PICs much less reserves than 
for life insurance companies, which was justified on the basis that PICs had joint 
liabilities – in case a PIC ended up to bankruptcy, the other companies would and 
continue even today to ‘inherit’ the liabilities.  The essential feature of this 
institutional arrangement was that it provided little reserves and solvency for 
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investment operations.8 Reserves in general were thought to be reserves for insurance, 
not investment risks (HE 241/1996 1996). The mechanism was considered successful 
and consistent until early 1990s, when the arrangement faced severe critiques as 
technical provision rates needed more flexibility and other investment options were 
gaining more legitimacy (see next section). 
 
The funds did not have such capital reserve requirements. In case of those funds 
taking care of second-pillar pension insurance, the company funds did not need to 
hold particular assets to cover any of pension liabilities before 1991, when the 
requirement was set to 75 % of current and future pension benefits by law, and the 
parent company needed to provide funds only the amounts needed to cover cash flows 
in any period of time. This was also possible in case of TEL insurances as long as The 
Finnish Centre for Pensions (Eläketurvakeskus, ETK) provided a credit guarantee for 
the asset deficit.9 Nor had the company and industry-wide funds any significant direct 
restrictions in terms of asset classes and allocations – they could use bonds, loan 
incomes, stocks, shares, mutual and other fund units, real estate, land, reinsurance 
incomes, tax refunds, material objects, cash, and even hydroelectric power plants, 
besides any other assets the Ministry of Social and Health Affairs would approve, to 
cover their liabilities (HE 188/1995 1996). Although the TEL funds, in contrast to 
PICs, could make numerous different kinds of investments, the main rationale for 
investments reminded rather German book reserves than Anglo-American funds. 
                                                
8 In the pre-1997 TEL funding rules concerning PICs, an annual nominal discount rate (rahastokorko) 
of 5 percent of investment returns was transferred to the funds. The technical provision 
(laskuperustekorko) served as a minimum criterion for investment yield and was also the base rate for 
the premium loans. The yields between these rates were used to pension benefit payments, and the 
yields exceeding the technical provision rate were used almost fully to lower the employers’ pension 
contributions. 
9 The guarantees were explicitly meant to replace solvency requirements and were mandatory for both 
fund types. The formerly public function went bankrupt and was privatized in 1994 to the insurance 
company Garantia. 
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Many groups of small employers were concerned that PICs invested their assets only 
in the biggest companies and planned having industry-wide funds to ensure their own 
capital availability. However, the PICs created a new earmarked credit instrument, 
union loan agreements (liittolainasopimus), to respond to these pressures lowering 
potential demand (Pentikäinen 1997). 
 
In Sweden funds were mostly directed towards social housing projects, which was 
also an important target albeit in much lesser scale in Finland. In the third TUPO, so-
called 'UKK-deal', the labour market organisations agreed that PIC would invest in 
rental housing production in 1972-73. Interestingly, this caused the pension providers 
to be somewhat active in partly state-sponsored housing (ARAVA) investments until 
late 1980s when the scheme ceased to exist (Kostamo 1997). Yet it must be noted that 
Finnish pension fund capitalism was never about ‘social investments’ as it wasn’t 
about achieving maximum portfolio returns. There was a paradigmatic difference 
between Finnish TEL investments both to the investments in preceding schema and to 
the Swedish AP investments. The national pension system assets were used to basic 
infrastructure (roads, electricity) and forest industry investments in Northern and 
Eastern Finland, whereas TEL funds were invested to more urban targets, industry 
and trade. TEL funds had 'helped to readjust industry and trade to international 
competition and affected changes in production structure especially since 1967' 
(Niemelä 1994). 
 
In mid 1970s, the rate of pension contributions became to be understood as a tool for 
counter-cyclical economic policy (see also Salminen 1987, Kostamo 1997). In 1975, 
the target level of TEL pensions was set to 60 % of wages – yet the average level 
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remained near 50 % – which somewhat changed the discursive understanding on 
pension futures after regular postponement of the issue (and indeed pension costs) in 
labour market agreements before that time (Lundqvist 1998). The policy of lowering 
TEL contributions caused much tension between the finance ministry and the pension 
providers. The ministry even planned obligatory investment targets and suggested the 
abolition of premium lending system, which sparked stronger cooperation between 
pension providers and labour market organisations on one hand but also political 
parties as channels for influencing policies on the other (Kostamo 1997). The politics 
on contribution level in short-term was in Finland to stay. This is not to say it had not 
been a long-term concern from the beginning. According to Pentikäinen (1997, p.36), 
the original principle in creating the TEL scheme was that Finnish businesses should 
not be subject to higher contribution rates than their rivals in other countries, namely 
Sweden. In other words, the TEL investments were not only supposed to buffer 
against the adoption of employer-sponsored statutory pensions but to broadly improve 
national competitivity. Premium lending generated general economic growth, 
customer compensations of exceptional investment performance improved the 
financial conditions of those firms that didn’t need these loans, and investment loans 
enabled productive and well-employing business projects, whilst social investments to 
housing or other state-led projects and equity investments to take corporate control 
were minimal. 
 
In Sweden, meanwhile, there had been some important changes in the institutional 
arrangements. The labour market interest to dominate the funds continued to grow. 
However, the original aspiration of the labour movement to control industry policy-
making was being effectively curtailed by the legislative framework. As Pontusson 
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(1992) concludes, the ability of the unions to influence industrial policy and control 
capital was cut by the ‘strategic capacity of business to exclude’ unions from 
industrial strategy (p. 235). The fourth AP fund, established in 1974, was enabled to 
buy shares with voting rights and to acquire a more substantial role in directly 
controlling the economy in contrast to the less potent second pillar funds. The 
difference between the AP4 and APs 1–3 was that the former was a portfolio investor 
that was allowed to buy shares without, however, gaining too substantial an amount of 
shares which could influence strategic decisions. Although the funds did not 
coordinate their actions even in those firms to which funds had concentrated their 
highest legally possible stake, 10% of shares or votes, there was always a group of 
owners that would own a very broad majority of the firm (for details, see Whyman 
2004). A fifth fund that was able to invest in equities and property was introduced in 
1988. 
 
The AP schemes were temporarily very successful in meeting their social policy 
objectives since the funds provided generous benefits to their recipients and increased 
the value of their assets vis-à-vis ATP contributions. But it was becoming clear in the 
early 1980s that the investment performance and the system more broadly could not 
quite fulfil its pension promise (Palme 2005a). Anecdotally, the Finns started to call 
failed earnings-related pension provision ‘the Swedish disease’ (Pentikäinen 1997). In 
the turn of the decade, the committee that was brought together in 1984 published its 
report and predicted that the Swedish pension system would meet major financial 
difficulties in the first decades of the 21st century. The committee itself did not 
propose to reform ATP scheme but rather to restore pensioners’ income level by 
indexing benefits with income growth. SAP government however proposed a new 
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round of discussions for the pension system while at the same time lifted any 
restrictions for the investment of the AP funds. The liberalisation of funds’ investment 
practices was a demand by the LO, and partly their demands were met through the 
introduction of the new Private Pension Scheme (PPS).  
 
The 1984 pension committee had acknowledged the need for raising contribution 
rates to meet the demands of the pension system as well as the suggestion that the AP 
funds would shrink in 15 years. Under the old system, the contribution rates were 
estimated to be around 23.5% in 1990 and predicted to reach 40% in 2015 (as 
calculated by the Pension Committee in 1994, see Selén, Ståhlberg 2007). The 
solutions offered were either an increase of employers’ labour costs through higher 
contributions or the reduction of wage-earners income. Both options were dismissed 
on different accounts and, essentially, the ATP schemes were not modernised to cope 
with emerging social needs, resulting to an intentional institutional drift. The 
maturation of the ATP scheme by the end of the 1980s necessitated further 
adjustments to the pension system, since it would render ATP an expensive 
programme to run. But it had also placed a ceiling in the amount of savings that it 
could receive. The ATP could have not met its social policy objectives in the long-
term, which caused a growing percentage of the population diverting its pension 
savings to private plans. The deliberate neglect to modernise the ATP schemes thus 
promoted the role of mutual funds and private solutions such as the development of 
the Private Pensions’ Scheme (PPS, Allemanssparandet) and a mutual fund saving 
scheme, Allemansfond (the Everyone’s fund) (Jonsson, Lounsbury 2004). 
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The pressures for changes in the Finnish regime came in 1990s rather than 1980s. In 
the year 1980, premium loans still accounted for over 60% of all investments, and 
when bond investments, investment loans and cash were added, they constituted about 
staggering 95% of all investments. However, in the ‘casino years’ of late 1980s, also 
some TEL money was blown when the financial bubble burst. PIC Eläke-Kansa had 
to cover losses arising from international reinsurances (including e.g. many activities 
in tax havens) and scandalous so-called Kouri-deals, and was eventually bankrupt 
(after a decade of litigation) whilst its assets had been also used to prep up finances of 
the EKA group owning the Kansa group (Pentikäinen 1997, p. 142). When the 
deepest recession any OECD country had seen since the Second World War hit 
Finland, nearly 40 percent of all TEL investments were directed at Finnish 
government bonds in first half of the 1990s. This was regarded as very inconsistent in 
relation to the goal of enhancing Finnish corporate sector’s capital availability. The 
old investment constraints had exhausted while the intended target had remained. TEL 
investments were becoming central issues in public debate. The collapse of Eläke-
Kansa triggered a broad public debate on how pension funds should be invested 
(Kostamo 1997). The debate was very lively. For example in mid-1990s, the SMEs 
and self-employed wanted to abandon the funding component of the system in order 
to lower the contributions (until 2007) to ease the rough times (Vuoristo 1996). 
 
After the financial and money markets were liberalized in late 1980s there was a 
major normative and discursive shift in the investment paradigm. The leaders of 
largest Finnish companies had conquered the major PIC BoDs and the social 
insurance experience had been replaced by professional business and finance 
paradigm in early 1990s (Pentikäinen 1997, p. 128–129). In the early 1990s, the 
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employees’ interests in investments changed when the TEL contributions became to 
be shared by both employers and employees, just like the employers had demanded 
from the beginning (ibid. p.36). Financial markets were gaining preference over 
premium lending and ‘investment loans’, internationally diversified investment over 
national dependencies, and cutting costs of baby boomer generation retirement with 
short-term investment over securing national capital supply in times of low demand 
for premium loans among TEL system stakeholders (Työmarkkinoiden 
keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä 2006). The institutions of a private national 
economic development project were converted into market-led financial capitalism. 
What made this change so dramatic was the complete loss of faith in planning and 
effective governance so strong in 1960s and 70s and the great transformations in the 
Finnish financial sector (Soikkanen 1998).10 The new paradigm would include broad 
portfolio diversification and competition. The labour market parties and TELA was 
mandated to canvas the new investment landscape, which would turn into a new 
powerful coordination body, Puro workgroup, and a major regulative reform of 1997. 
 
The institutional change processes from the original paradigms in two countries were 
quite different. The investments bounded by regulation providing little solvency and 
room for innovation had exhausted in Finland, but for reasons opposite to Sweden that 
suffered from drift in respect to pension promises and contribution rates but was 
legitimate in investments. The TEL scheme was financially sustainable in the 
liabilities side – it was purely the usage of assets that was exhausted in respect to the 
new economic environment. In both cases the change first in discursive investment 
                                                
10 The beginning of 1990s saw many traditional institutions of Finnish economy, most importantly the 
financial system – the traditional blue, red and "green" (agrarian) capital either disappeared or was 
merged to international capital – to vanish and the broadly shared experience of insecurity to step in. 
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paradigm and later in norms had changed during the 1980s and early1990s, but as our 
analysis in the next section shows, it is not just the different motivations for change 
and exhaustion of different institutions but also the actual change processes that are of 
great importance in the shifts towards the new investment paradigm shared by the 
both countries. In Sweden, major paradigmatic reforms on pension regime in 1990s 
and 2000s would permanently change the social investment and ‘buffer finance for 
national economy’ paradigm to a professional global portfolio investment paradigm, 
whilst the Finnish shift was enabled by surprisingly minor parametric reforms. 
 
 
 
Towards Global Portfolio Investments: Reforms in the 
1990s and 2000s 
 
 
The governance of the new pension system reflects the power asymmetries among the 
key actors and how power struggle comes to be realised for the change of welfare 
institutions. In contrast with the previous pension reforms there have been 
fundamental differences in the process of implementation, the content and the logic of 
the pension scheme. The appointment of the pension committee aimed for the creation 
of a political consensus for the implementation of the reform. However, societal 
interests and especially those of the nominal owners of the pension savings were 
excluded from the implementation process. The governance of the pension reform 
therefore remained an exclusive ‘top-down’ decision of political parties’ 
representatives. Organised labour was not part of the pension committee but 
maintained its ties with SAP and at the Social Democratic Party Congress. The 
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parliamentary representatives of SAP approved the reform before the party members 
approved it and despite their criticisms, they effectively imposed a dilemma to party 
members; whether the multi-party proposal was accepted or the whole process of the 
reform was brought to an end with union members receiving the blame. Despite the 
fact the majority of regional union units were initially against it (Kangas, Lundberg et 
al. 2006), party members finally accepted the proposal. 
 
The Swedish 1998 pension reform that became effective in 2001 was from pension 
scheme perspective a path departure from the old prefunded DB system to a new 
partially funded notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme. The reform kept the 
18.5% of annual earnings as the pension contribution rate, with 16% directed to the 
PAYG NDC pension accounts and 2.5% to private investment reserve funds called 
premium pension (FDC) (see Figure 2). The pension contribution of an employee is 
7% of the wage, added with some contributions from the social insurance system and 
unemployment insurance. Employers pay 10.21% of the employees’ wage sum to the 
pension system. The contributions are set to 17.21% because the replacement rate for 
maximum pension is calculated as 93% of the ceiling contributions. The individual 
will continue to accrue his pension right even in time of unemployment or in case of 
injury through the contributions of the unemployment and disability insurance system 
respectively.  The pension regime provides a universal but not flat-rate basic benefit 
as the old system. This new arrangement was applied from the Finnish solution that 
had re-coupled the basic pensions and earnings-related pension in a new albeit not 
exactly the same way (see Hietaniemi & Ritola 2007). The Swedes introduced a 
means-tested basic guarantee pension – recently discussed by the Finnish government 
in a similar form – that aimed at alleviating poverty of people who were not able 
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achieve the necessary level of contributions through the earnings-related scheme. The 
pension reform replaced the Basic pension and ATP scheme with the new income and 
premium pension.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Swedish AP/PPM provision structures. Source: Andra AP-Fonden 
 
From the asset management perspective, perhaps the most important issue is that the 
division of labour between AP funds is different from before. The first four AP funds 
were given equal portfolios and new mandates and constraints (see Table 3) when 
assets were redistributed to the new scheme execution. The primary goal of these 
funds is to ‘maximise long-term return on capital in relation to investment risk’ 
(Ministry of Finance cited in Weaver 2004: 304). There is an emphasis for more long-
term and well-managed investment while at the same time bearing in mind ethical and 
environmental considerations. These old ATP funds are used to cover their liabilities 
individually but mainly used as buffer funds i.e. wound up in case of demographic or 
economic crises. 200 million SEK of old ATP assets were transferred to an 
established Sixth pension fund. The sixth fund aims at enhancing investments in small 
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and medium companies. The established Seventh fund is a primarily index-tracking, 
passively managed (although famous also for operationally separating alpha 
investment from beta strategy) ‘default fund’, which means it is investing for those 
employees that do not want to choose between the Premium Pension fund managers. 
Currently there is no Fifth AP fund. 
 
 
Directives and restrictions for the AP fund investments 
No more than 70% of the Fund’s assets may be invested in equities 
At least 30% of each fund’s assets must be in low-risk interest-bearing securities 
No more than 10% of any funds assets ‘may be exposed to a single issuer or group of issuers 
No individual fund may hold more than 10% of the voting shares of any listed company 
At least 10% of each fund’s money must be managed externally (by January 2002) 
No more than 5% of assets of any fund can be held in unlisted securities and any such 
investments should be made indirectly 
No fund may hold equity holdings in Swedish companies greater than 2% of the capitalisation 
of the Stockholm stock exchange 
No more than 40% of the Fund’s assets may be exposed to currency risk 
No restrictions on the share of the Fund’s assets that may be invested outside Sweden 
Table 3. Investment rules as set by the Swedish National Pension Fund Act. Source: 
Weaver (2004, p. 305), Första AP-Fonden (2007) 
 
 
The four first AP funds were now allowed to diverge in their investments. A long-
term split of 69/31% between bonds and equities in their enactment has shifted 
towards favouring more equity in all four funds. The share of equity investments 
differs among the funds. The fourth fund has reached 63.3% share of equity in total 
portfolio. The investment in Swedish equities remains between 12% and 24% in the 
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funds (Weaver 2004). The change in investment regulation diverted investments from 
productivity growth and bond-mediated economic growth but the funds are still 
prevented exercising any significant power in listed companies, including having 
representatives in BoDs. The reform therefore maintained the professional portfolio 
management ethos and again gave priority to high returns under new mandates and 
constraints. In contrast to the previous arrangements, however, the actors making the 
actual decisions over pension fund investments are now private managers rather than 
stakeholder representatives. The latter are only able to nominate directors but the 
decision for the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman relies on the government (Yermo 
2008). 
 
For the premium-based pensions, the pension saver is expected to actively participate 
in the financial market by choosing among 500 fund managers available. Pension 
savers can change their fund – every day if they like – with no cost or to passively 
rely to the public default pension fund (ISSA 2001). The premium pension accounts, 
contributions and licenses of asset managers are coordinated by a regulatory authority, 
Premiepensionmyndigheten (PPM) that bears the responsibility for administration of 
and information provision on the scheme. The funds are not allowed to be controlled 
by their nominal owners and remain at the hands of private managers that are 
responsible for investing pension funds assets, either internally or externally. Despite 
several programmes and attempts (Belfrage, Ryner 2009 forthcoming, Palme, 
Svensson 2003), the original percentage of beneficiaries that exercise their ability to 
choose between funds fell from 70% in 2001 to 9% the next years  (Palme 2005b), 
and effectively the majority of the premium pension savers switch to the default fund.   
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This has had interesting ‘side effects’ to the investment policy. The seventh AP Fund 
has decided to trade shares of many well-known companies such as Coca-Cola, 
General Motors, Nestle, Texaco due to incidents of bribery and business ethic 
breaches (NPRN 2008). The fund also invests for example in gambling and tobacco 
companies (Weaver 2003), and recently the AP funds have also invested in arms 
construction and dealing companies such as Halliburton and Wal-Mart. The Ethical 
Council of the Swedish National Pension Funds that controls investments have, 
however, impeded such investments for companies that do not meet the ILO 
convention of workers’ rights and international conventions regarding social rights, 
environment, bribery, corruption and the use of certain weapons (e.g. cluster 
munitions). AP funds are obliged to ‘name and shame’ the listed companies without 
however screening these firms outside investment horizon in the future (Ethical-
Council 2007). Interestingly, ethical and social corporate responsibility is high in the 
agenda of AP funds governance, despite the lack of a clear directive or principle for 
these investments. For example, AP7 has extensive corporate governance principles11 
although they are legally not able to use voting rights. According to its annual reports 
the AP7 is a full financial professional, also using investment methods such as 
shorting and currency speculation. 
 
Since the implementation of the premium pension in 2000, the increasing 
contributions channelled to the scheme have exceeded the returns from the 
investments. The former still provides the necessary capital for AP funds to deliver 
their liabilities. The returns of AP funds were not only negative during the recent 
financial crisis but also experienced a serious fall in 2005. In fact, until 2005 for every 
                                                
11 See http://www.ap7.se/dokument/policy/Policy_for_Corporate_Governance.pdf 
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SEK that was credited to the system there was a loss of 9% from the investments 
(SOU 2005). Between 2006 and 2008, the AP funds growth was restored but still 
didn’t meet the target of a 5.1–6.1% annual average rate of returns. This target acts as 
a benchmark for the AP funds Board of Directors. Recently, the turmoil in the 
financial markets caused a decrease of approximately 20% of the market value of AP 
assets. The losses were higher for the AP funds that invested more in equity while the 
returns from fixed-income still provided positive returns. A substantial share of the 
investment is allocated towards non-Swedish equities, while investment towards fixed 
income such as government bonds remained low. 
 
The financial status of the Swedish earnings-related pension system is expressed as 
balance ratio between assets (the value of future contributions plus the cumulative 
returns from fund investments) and liabilities (future pension obligations). In case the 
balance between assets and liabilities falls below 1 then so-called automatic balancing 
mechanisms are activated. The 2008 investment returns averaged -20% and future 
projections suggested that the balance ratio would move below the threshold of 1. 
This means that the pension benefits provided by 2010 will effectively be reduced and 
unless there is a recovery in the balance ratio, it would continue to apply within the 
next years. The low returns from the investments did not, however, meant that 
pension funds sold their assets amidst the crisis. In contrast to insurance companies, 
the AP funds are not subject to market valuation. The strategy of the AP funds was to 
respond with a discourse on ‘long-term planning’. Despite the severe losses from 
equities, AP funds seem reluctant to drop their equity shares and high-risk 
investments from their portfolios, in the hope that in the long-run, the returns from 
equities will outperform the returns from government and corporate bonds.  
55 
 
 AP1 AP2 AP3 AP4 
Equities 
(Swedish) 
13% 18% 9.7% 18% 
Equities  
(non-Swedish) 
40% 35% 45.9% 38% 
Equities 
(Emerging markets) 
16% 5%  2% 
Fixed-income  
(Swedish) 
9% 10.5% 6.0% 
Fixed income  
(Non-Swedish) 
9% 
 
 
35% 26.5% 31.0% 
Alternative Assets 3%  16.7%  
Real Estate  5.0% 8.9% 4.0% 
Private Equity  1.0% 6.0% 1.0% 
Profit/Loss 2008  
(Annual) 
-21,7%* 
 
-24.1% -19.7% -20.8% 
SEK (bn) 172.0 173.3 181.0 164.0 
 
Table 4. The first four AP fund allocations at a glance in 2008. (*equities -40.1 %, 
fixed income +8.3 %) Source: Första, Andra.,Tredje and Fjärde AP Fonden.  
 
 
From an institutional change perspective on asset management, the Swedish reform 
was not nearly as dramatic as it was from the liabilities point of view. The new 
version of portfolio management was not a liberalised one but different in the strong 
rule-based (i.e. not principle-based) mandate and constraints. The change marked a 
clear shift from primarily qualitative restrictions (i.e. no investments in equity apart 
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from AP4) to quantitative ones (e.g. 70 % ceiling in equity, 30 % minimum in low-
risk securities), although some important qualitative restrictions were dismantled (e.g. 
foreign investments). The long-term paradigm includes many concerns over 
‘shareholder value’ and non-marked-to-market valuation methods is still an important 
feature in the institutional framework of Swedish pension asset management. In this 
regulative sense, the change was not so drastic, and the new system exemplifies 
continuity in quite many terms. Now, however, the investments cannot be targeted to 
social projects via national budget or to large economic projects due to the 
diversification rules. We argue that the change re-enforced the logic of maximising 
returns as professionalist portfolio investments, not ‘corporate controllers’, simply by 
broadening the available vehicles and narrowing individual stakes. 
 
It could be argued that the new NDC system was translated to the already dominant 
institutional understanding on proper pension investments rather than other way 
around, while the old investment paradigms exhausted with ATP and LO dominance. 
In normative and discursive terms, the change was indeed only one part in a longer 
change process. Interestingly, the new arrangement has not performed any better – 
much worse some could argue – in terms of matching liabilities, which was the cause 
of drift and exhaustion of the old paradigms. In contrast, it is just immune to financial 
stress in accountancy terms since bad performance simply means lower minimum 
pensions. 
 
In contrast to the Swedish drift experience, the old institutional arrangement for 
Finnish TEL investments had drifted simply because the pension capital was and, 
more importantly, could not be allocated to the originally intended target since it was 
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not the fund managers who could fully decide over meeting this target. Premium loans 
became almost obsolete and investment loans much less popular when the financial 
markets were opened and liberalized. The change in demand for premium loans was 
very rapid: the loans accounted for 63.0 % of all PIC investments in 1980 in contrast 
to only 15.4 % in 1997 (see Figure 1, p. 40). The TEL investors had no alternatives 
but to increase investments in other targets, but due to their scarce capital reserves 
they had few options but to invest most of incoming contributions in government 
bonds. This target was essential as it helped to save the state from the recession and 
arguably even more essential in revitalizing the economy to a new ICT-driven growth 
track in the mid 1990s. Despite this merit, the new allocation schema was broadly 
considered to be against the original rationale for investments (HE 241/1996). In other 
words, it was not enough that the funds were channelled to private business by private 
business for the collective private economic development – it had to happen directly, 
in a market-driven manner in which each investee firm is judged according to its 
financial performance rather than economic potential. Moreover, it had to happen by 
managing investment risks and new kinds of future uncertainties. When Eläke-Kansa 
collapsed, the system stakeholders decided in concert to start discussing about new 
possibilities for investment rules and practices. The reforms were to be designed in 
two much overlapping fronts.  
 
New investment rules and practices were to be negotiated in the so-called Puro 
workgroup – named after PIC Ilmarinen CEO Kari Puro who chaired the meetings 
and formally called the ‘Pensions negotiation group of central labour market 
organisations’ (Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä) – that was 
formed in early 1990s in order to discuss the sharing of contributions between 
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employers and employees (which came in effect in 1993). The group, comprising of 
all central labour market representatives as primary members and the CEOs of the two 
biggest PICs as expert advisors, had now been given a much broader mandate. Puro 
group was to be very powerful in setting the future agendas with its consensual 
outcomes that rare dared to denounce – it has been often argued in popular media that 
“the politicians gave the power to the group” (Seies 2006). It was based on purely 
normative mandate and achieved a strong status as an able institutional entrepreneur. 
The investment rule reforms of 1997 and 2007 were both negotiated in and by the 
group, and more or less just rubber-stamped by the parliament. The other front was 
the more general legal reform process on the general legal mandate of the pension 
provision, whose main goal was to clarify the organizational independence and the 
endogenisation of risks to operational management (Louekoski 1997) in the 
conditions of EU membership and questionable corporate governance structures. This 
process was initiated by a report written for the parliament by Mr. Matti Louekoski of 
Bank of Finland. Some parts of this process had however already been started in 
TUPO agreements of early 1990s. 
 
It was clear for all parties involved in the Puro group that the primary institutional 
constraints for any new investment focus were the old funding rules that provided 
little solvency for the PICs. There was also broad support for the ideas that the 
investments ought to be more subjected to market discipline, the supervision of 
beneficiary interest enhanced to meet ‘fiduciary standards’, and the beneficiary voice 
to be better heard in investment decision-making (Louekoski 1997). The explicit 
reasons for reforms that were stated first in the government bill were ‘the new 
conditions in the investment environment’ and interest rate levels (HE 241/1996 
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1996). This can be interpreted so that there was a very clear new discursive 
understanding about investments and their environment, but this is not to say that 
there was a clear consensus or even normative understanding on the proper solutions 
and new arrangements. 
 
The main rationale for this part of the reform was simply to give a broader mandate in 
the execution of the current system in a more diversified (in terms of asset allocation) 
yet cost-efficient manner – or, to be converted to new pension security provision 
under new conditions. It introduced one application of a public traffic-light 
supervision method common to Nordic countries in which the extent of public control 
was based on solvency zones and the zones were based on portfolio theory based risk-
adjustments and allocations between asset classes. Put simply, different investment 
styles created different zones. Now, the extra investment yields could be used in 
increasing providers’ capital reserves and other targets (e.g. customer compensations) 
according to solvency zones.12 The law also introduced a new mechanism within the 
liabilities, which could be used to buffer individual PIC losses with collective buffer 
assets. The reform also gave Supervisory Boards elected by annual shareholder 
meetings a major role as operational supervisors of PIC BoDs. 
 
The Puro group report ended up into a government bill (HE 241/1996), but it also 
suggested various further reforms further discussed in the Louekoski report. The 
report was very relevant in respect to responsibilities and decision-making in 
investment management and illustrated well the various possible forms the late 1990s 
                                                
12 From 1997 to 2006 the TEL fund liabilities were increased annually by a nominal 3 percent discount 
rate with an adjustment factor. In order to improve the solvency in the short term, the law included that 
the yields between nominal discount rate and technical provision rate were moved to the capital 
reserves instead of liabilities for 2–3 years in the late 1990s. 
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reforms could have taken. It included four broad options for the future(see Louekoski 
1997 for details), but adopted a model in which TEL providers would continue to be 
based on separate laws also defining provider-entities. This option was considered the 
most consistent because it made a clear demarcation from both limited and insurance 
companies, although some constitutional problems on who owns the assets remained. 
The main argument against other options was that the decentralization was beneficial 
due to competition. Competition was supposed to guarantee the development of 
provision models and thus provide indirect benefits for the insured (Louekoski 1997). 
 
The new law on PICs based on Louekoski report concentrated all issues that made 
PICs different from insurance and limited company law in terms of corporate 
governance and more general mandates and constraints (HE 255/1996 1996). The 
asset management of PIC should be now completely independent from insurance 
groups and other influences both formally and in personal relations and individuals’ 
status. The solution adopted relied on gradual change towards increasing financial 
professionalism however subject to labour market consensus. Most importantly, the 
reform introduced a 10 % ceiling in share vote ownership and/or voting rights in other 
PICs and finance sector organizations under public supervision without permission 
from the Ministry for Social and Health Affairs (STM), which was intended to reduce 
financial concentration and TEL provider control over the finance sector. The law 
introduced new required qualifications for CEOs and BoDs of PICs. The former 
should now have qualified experience on social insurance, investment management 
and business management and the latter must include investment expertise. The role 
of BoDs was strengthened: they should now prepare all important issues for the 
annual shareholder meetings and their members were reserved a right to address in the 
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meetings. The role of internal dissent of BoDs was also highlighted as it now required 
two thirds’ majority (previously simple majority) consent when required investment 
plans – the only major avenue for direct public control over PIC assets, which was 
strengthened – were made. The labour market organisations were given a mandate to 
nominate one auditor. 
 
The Finnish shift towards financial professionalism without losing the old paradigms 
or changing ‘the liability side’ of pensions was deliberate and consensual yet 
contingent. It was based on new ideas quite independent of developments elsewhere 
than before: in the preparatory documents other countries or non-local practices are 
rarely even mentioned. Yet, it has numerous references to international markets. 
Indeed, the conversion to professional portfolio investment included both much ‘good 
path dependence’ and new ideas and innovations. Although the narrative concerning 
the 1997 reform is based on arguments on ‘changes in external conditions’ and 
objective consensus, it was not these conditions but new kind of financial 
professionalism – liquidity-prized and portfolio theory based risk management and 
profit-making via secondary market exchange transactions – that had already started 
to conquer the PICs combined with the new version of politics of competitivity (i.e. 
contribution rate control) that fuelled the change. By simultaneously slightly 
broadening the mandate and significantly loosening constraints, and slightly 
improving public and definitely mathematics-based control, small regulative changes 
and parametric reforms caused a paradigmatic change in how institutions were used. 
The national corporatist economic development project was turned into professional 
portfolio management for pension provision. 
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Pension providers fulfilled the purpose and promise of the reform with high 
investment performance. The conditions of the TMT boom provided over 10 percent 
annual real investment returns in 1998–1999. The crash of the bubble caused low or 
even slightly negative investment returns in 2000–2002, but from 2003–2007, the 
annual real returns returned to the level of 6–10 percent. The growth in pension fund 
size was very significant in 2003–2007 as TEL/TyEL assets grew from €57.3 billion 
in 2003 to €82.2 billion in 2007. The decade following 1997 was in absolute terms 
marked by sharply increased equity investment and stable investment in Finland (€30 
billion or so) and, in relative terms, increasing foreign investments. Whilst the PIC 
investments became more foreign equity and pioneers in alternative classes – some 
PICs had almost 15 % of their investments in e.g. hedge funds in 2007 – the TEL 
funds had a less drastic shift in allocations between different asset classes. In contrast, 
the PICs lowered the relative weight of Finnish assets in their portfolios more slowly 
than the funds that relied almost entirely on domestic assets still in late 1990s (see 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Pension insurance company, company fund and industry-wide fund 
investment portfolios by asset classes and currency areas in 2000–2008. (Shares’ 
include investments in mutual equity funds, hedge funds and private equity, and since 
2004, investments in money market funds are included in money market investments 
instead of bonds.) Source: TELA 
 
 
The quick shift towards international portfolio investments was hardly a surprise. 
Kangas (2006) suggests it was the financial liberalisation and opening that made 
international focus easier, the Eurozone membership that eliminated currency risks 
that were previously a major concern, and the critique on low domestic investment 
yields that legitimised the shift of Finnish investments to international investments. 
The global ‘language of finance’ (Clark & Wójcik 2007) penetrated Finnish pension 
finances culturally as well. Kangas (ibid.) for insance argues one important feature 
behind rapidly increasing investments abroad is the simple observation that pension 
investors monitor indices all over the world as benchmarks. There was an active 
discussion on the proper normative use of the assets, ‘which concluded that the main 
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task of the pension scheme was to safeguard future pension promises, and as foreign 
investments appeared to give better dividends they were also regarded as safer 
investments’ (p. 10). It must be noted that different weightings in different asset 
classes do not yet imply diversification in the strong meaning of the word. For 
example in 2004, half of the TEL investments were in bonds, and about 90 % of these 
investments were in Finnish, French and German sovereign bonds. Although the goal 
of portfolio investments was to diversify against the performance of a single national 
economy – one of the main rationales not to have only PAYG systems – this kind of 
investment behaviour rather implied a new kind of dependence on performance of 
European states and firms. 
 
There were a few important discursive changes before the next big reforms in mid 
2000s. Competition between TEL providers became an important issue: aims at 
higher returns, more tailored service provision and cost-efficiency as means for 
competition that was supposed to prevent concentration in the sector (STM 2002). 
Again, this would require even more solvency, which was one of the reasons behind 
new reform on investment boundary conditions. Moreover, a report (Kausto 2002) 
commissioned by STM on the risks faced by the TEL system suggested that 
investment risk management ought to be better managed in collective terms. In 2006, 
‘the Rajaniemi report’ (Rajaniemi 2007) raised various other issues directly 
concerning asset management in context of competition. It noticed a clear shift from 
insurance provision to ‘investment fund’ ethos. Perhaps the most interesting argument 
was that there was no clear distinction between internal (funds) and external (PICs) 
management of assets in the regime. The laws on both types of funds ought now to be 
re-evaluated and later combined, not least because both types had lost their popularity. 
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There were some very detailed suggestions as well, including the suggestion to make 
investments in real estate and property funds easier by changing the tax treatment and 
making pricing more transparent. TEL was changed into TyEL in beginning of 2007. 
The most important feature of this shift from the asset management side was that the 
dedicated fund taking care of all non-TEL earnings-related investments was 
transformed into a new PIC Etera. The more specific changes in TyEL provision were 
again commissioned by the Puro group and the STM-set expert group led by Mr. 
Louekoski. The task13 for the Puro group was to discuss how the TEL/TyEL provider 
solvency and balance rules could be reformed in order to increase riskier and more 
profitable investments, and how more of the investments could be targeted to Finland, 
whereas the Louekoski mandate was to clarify the legal mandate of PICs in respect to 
new law on listed companies and insurance companies. 
 
The 2006 Puro workgroup report (Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen 
eläkeneuvotteluryhmä 2006) illustrates par excellence the end results of two 
discursive shift that started in the 1990s. The first shift is the emerged financial 
professionalism and technocratic governance. One conclusion drawn in the report was 
that the investment allocations were suboptimal in terms of risk-taking, and thus 
equity and alternative investments needed to be increased and solvency improved 
with new (merged) solvency and balance rules, now common to all provider types, 
that would again increase capital reserves and make part of liability transfers 
dependent on collective equity investment performance. The simulated projections on 
the share of equity investments implied a 20–25 % of total portfolios in the long-term 
                                                
13 This was the last one commissioned by Puro group that became Rantala group after the retired CEO 
Puro was replaced by non-PIC actor, ETK director Jukka Rantala as the group chair in 2007-08. 
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and the new target share was set to 35 %. The report stated that the previous 
regulations were inflexible and ‘far too detailed’, whereas the new introduced 
regulations included very complex mathematical formulae in order to define the ‘real 
risk levels’ of individual investments instead of ‘legally defined risks’ for new 
financial products such as structured investments and hedge funds. In other words, the 
control over TyEL assets was to be more detailed and increasingly MPT-based. 
 
The second shift was the shift within the national competitivity paradigm from 
economic performance to financial conditions. This also refers to a new operational 
weighting, in which the PAYG part became even more distant from the administration 
of the funded part. The employment rate was no more considered an important feature 
in Finnish investments, which was now dominated by the idea of making increases in 
domestic investment dependent on the foreign investors’ opinion on the investment 
environment. Domestic investments could be explicitly increased only if Finnish 
financial markets were ‘deepened’, for example if tax policies were more investor-
friendly, households increased savings in equity, and Finnish firms listed more often. 
The report states that pension capital cannot be used to make decisions over the 
economy (which is done by firms). The new ‘financialised’ culture of TyEL 
investments could use power over Finnish economy in terms of real investments and 
employment only if businesses decided to do so, and more generally to operate in 
Finland only if the state would create financially luring conditions or other Finnish 
capital, explicitly mentioning household bank accounts, took an initiative. 
 
In regulative terms, the current institutional framework for TyEL investments is based 
on a mandate providing solvency for global portfolio investments and few albeit 
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significant constraints for investment activities, although requiring much competency 
from the provider managers. This mandate includes various ways in which the TyEL 
providers are steered. The new control methods include complex mathematics14 and 
the idea of imposed self-control, most importantly enforced through annually required 
investment plans that are approved by the FIN-FSA. The law on TyEL proviers’ 
solvency and liabilities (1114/2006) introduced new discursive categorisations for 
asset classes (see Table 5), in which each category includes different risk factors in 
solvency border calculation. There is a 10 % ceiling on individual stakes in stock 
investments apart from investment funds, introduced in current form in 2006 
(1125/2006). There is a 20 % of total portfolio ceiling for securities denominated in 
other currency than the euro, a 15 % ceiling for non-listed securities (excluding real 
estate and EEA or OECD government bonds), a 10 % ceiling for individual or highly 
related buildings (and funds targeted at or loans related to such buildings), a 5 % 
ceiling for securities emitted by a same community, and a 5 % ceiling to non-
collateralised debt (1114/2006).  
                                                
14 The solvency border for example is based on formula p = [ -(Σi βi mi – t) + a √ ( Σi,j βi βj si sj rij + λ2 
S2 )] /100 
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I Money Market 
Instruments 
II Bonds and 
Debentures 
III Real 
Estate 
IV Equity V Other 
investments 
Under one-year 
maturity obligations, 
in euros, borrowed 
or guaranteed by: 
1) Åland island, 
EEA or OECD 
country, a public 
body residing in 
such country, or  
international 
organisation in 
which at least 
one such 
country belongs 
to 
2) Insurance 
company or 
credit institution 
residing in an 
EEA or OECD 
country 
3) Publicly listed 
company 
residing in an 
EEA or OECD 
country 
4) Other bodies 
residing in an 
EEA or OECD 
country 
Premium loans and 
investment loans (and 
their interest rates) 
Over one-year maturity 
obligations (and their 
interest rates), in euros, 
borrowed or guaranteed 
by: 
1) Åland island, EEA or 
OECD country, a 
public body residing 
in such country, or  
international 
organisation in which 
at least one such 
country belongs to 
2) a public body residing 
in other than EEA or 
OECD country, or  
international 
organisation in which 
no country belongs to 
these groups 
3) Insurance company 
or credit institution 
residing in an EEA or 
OECD country 
4) Other bodies 
EEA or 
OECD -
residing 
residential 
buildings 
EEA or 
OECD -
residing 
business, 
office, 
hotel and 
industry 
buildings 
EEA or 
OECD -
residing 
other 
buildings 
Real estate 
in other 
areas than 
EEA or 
OECD 
countries 
Stocks 
and 
shares 
publicly 
listed in 
EEA and 
OECD 
countries 
Stocks 
and 
shares of 
companies 
registered 
to EEA or 
OECD 
country 
Other 
stocks and 
shares 
Under one-year 
maturity  
1) obligations in 
other currency 
than euro 
2) currency 
investments 
Over one-year 
maturity  
1) obligations in 
other currency 
than euro 
2) currency 
investments 
Metal, energy, 
other raw 
materials and 
commodities, 
rights on non-built 
land areas and 
hydroelectric 
plants, and other 
special rights 
All other 
investments 
 
Table 5. Legal investment asset class categorisations of Finnish TyEL providers. 
 
 
In contrast to the more return-oriented Swedish funds, the primary norm of proper 
investment behaviour among the stakeholders is long-term risk management, although 
the differences in these weightings that are both present in both countries are only 
subtle. In Finnish funds, the old national economic development paradigm has been 
introduced to the social responsibility (SR) thinking in form of ‘concerning Finnish 
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employment’. While the SR policies and principles of PICs are extensive, they usually 
lack transparency in terms of mechanisms. Similarly, ‘long-termism’ is an important 
discursive justification for activities in annual reports, but the mechanisms provided 
for this bias are not presented in detail. One of the main difference between TyEL 
providers and AP funds is that the former have been very active in promoting 
shareholder value and, for example, even preventing coups of Finnish firms – most 
notably the attempts of Iceland investment bank to restructure the governance system 
of the telecommunications firm Elisa few years ago – from abroad via primarily 
tactical shareholder activism, including voting rights, whilst ethical screening has 
been understood ineffective. In terms of allocations, there have been some further 
demands that a bigger part of the pension funds should be invested in various national 
research and development projects and the new infrastructure ‘required by the high-
tech society’ (Kangas 2006). Yet, the annual reports state that the primary interest in 
home markets is fuelled by deeper information availability and personal contacts with 
Finnish firms. Providers also compete albeit not only with customer compensations. It 
must be noted that although all recent reforms have highlighted that capital 
availability is not a problem in the Finnish economy and in this sense there is no need 
for increasing domestic investments, the domestic investments remain an essential 
source for actively sought legitimacy. 
 
In Finland, the financial crisis of 2007– did end up with massive losses in TyEL funds 
– for instance, the PICs made total losses of 15.2 %.15 The capital reserves and 
solvency rules proved very effective in terms of securing the DB system. However, 
the TyEL providers are under mark-to-market accounting rules, which implied that 
                                                
15 See http://www.tela.fi for details 
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they should have sold their liquid assets. This problem was tackled with an exception 
law that eliminated forced sales by raising the importance of equity performance-
dependent factor in liability formation, by using the collective buffers to improve 
individual funds’ solvency, and by moving only base 3 % of assets to liabilities in 
2008 and until 2010 (HE 180/2008 2008). The solvency ratio (reserves to liabilities) 
was decreased from 30 to 16 % during the year 2008, but the solvency rate (reserves 
to solvency requirements) was improved from 2 to 2.6 thanks to the provisory law. 
The Finnish system has not suffered from the crisis too much but rather shown its 
strengths. Arguably, the again-popular premium lending system might have even 
worked as an effective buffer against direct economic damages caused by the credit 
crunch. The financial performance has not yet questioned the long-term efficiency of 
the system, which is now based on 4 % annual real returns in simulations. The 
performance of mandatory private-sector pension funds from 1998–2008 was only 1.9 
%. According to TELA officials (authors’ personal communication), the TEL/TyEL 
funds have still ‘beaten the market’ for decades and it has been thus beneficial to 
make portfolio investments in general. Although it is too early to make any 
judgements, it is evident that all funded pensions systems that rely on financial 
markets may face some contestation in the future. As hypothesis, we expect this 
normative contestation to hit Swedish system worse than the Finnish scheme but also 
note that the crisis may have more profound effects on the regulative sustainability of 
the Finnish scheme administration.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
The institutional development paths of Swedish and Finnish pension first-pillar 
pension fund governance illustrate many institutional similarities yet with very 
significant differences in each case. Firstly, both countries have created partially 
funded first-pillar pension schemes that have generated significant amounts of capital 
for these economies for the last half century. Yet, the funding component was from 
the beginning embedded in very different kinds of pension schemes, which also 
played an important part in pension reforms. The Swedish universal minimum 
pension earnings-related DB scheme matured too early and became financially 
fundamentally unsustainable, which also caused the exhaustion of old investment 
institutions. The new NDC arrangement is very different from the original scheme 
and individuals also carry the investment risks. In Finland, the TEL/TyEL universal 
earnings-related pension scheme has been a great success from the pension provision 
point of view, and the scheme has survived all kinds of shocks with minor parametric 
changes (Vidlund 2006; Hinrichs & Kangas 2003), but it was the questioned 
investment targets and practices that caused some of the most important changes.  
 
Secondly, although residing in the first pillar and relying on collective political 
bargaining rather than individual choice, the Swedish assets have always been in 
nature public whiled the Finnish have been private. Comparing the origins of these 
financial actors, the Swedish public foundations, (original AP funds) have been led by 
state-nominated directors, whereas the Finnish TEL companies and funds are run by 
the Finnish business elite and labour market representatives. In brief, the Swedes 
opted for a state-led ‘politics against markets’ approach (Esping-Andersen, 1985) 
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while the Finns opted for a ‘markets against politics’ approach (Kangas 2007). It must 
be noticed, however, that this is not to say that the funds have always been used so 
that exemplify these paradigms, public or private. Indeed, the manifestation of 
difference in the second similarity is that in both countries the emergence of the funds 
was a matter of different national economic developments they both later abandoned. 
In Sweden, the project was a national state-led social project and financial 
transformation, in which pension funds became a new source for government 
spending and formerly very inflexible bank and insurance-company led private sector 
credit. In Finland, the project was a national collective yet private project of economic 
transformation, in which national business competitivity was enhanced with firm-
specific loans and employment projects. Neither country has enabled funds to take 
over corporate governance, although Finnish funds are now normatively pushed 
towards increasing shareholder activism.  
 
Thirdly, the two cases illustrate quite different ways in which similar professional 
global portfolio finance and other parts such as shareholder value bias and MPT-based 
risk management of the phenomenon we here call the financialisation of pension 
capital has been introduced. In Sweden, the introduction was first gradual but very 
limited and was later on in the early 2000s an intrinsic part of a paradigmatic 
historical change in pension policy. In Finland, the introduction was parametric and 
made gradual with rational policy design on investment boundary conditions. 
However, there is something peculiar about modern finance when it comes to the 
reforms. In neither country was the modern finance paradigm introduced by policy 
changes. Rather, it was a discursive institution that was an important ingredient in 
other institutional changes that took place in these countries. The new paradigm was 
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more enabled by regulative reforms in both countries than served as a cause for the 
reforms, but again in different ways. Yet, it was only in sense of enabling new 
discursive framework that the regulative reforms could be called ‘liberalisation’. The 
rules governing investments in both countries are still very strong – arguably much 
more technical in Finland – and embed investments in pension provision in very 
different ways. In both countries, funds have become properly technocratic ‘fifth 
stage pension fund capitalists’ (Clark & Hebb 2004) but ones that execute very 
different albeit important public task. 
  
These three issues imply that social policy and varieties of capitalism scholars have a 
real puzzle to solve if they want to classify welfare regimes consistently taking assets 
and liabilities into account. The Swedish project was a coordinated one (national 
funds and long-term state-mediated projects) and corporatist-fixed social democratic 
(universal earnings-related minimum DB) one from the beginning, but later found that 
the means of executing this project was becoming more liberal in investments 
(secondary market portfolio investments) and pension promises (individual NDC risks 
and personal choice element in PPM). The Finnish project was also a coordinated one 
(dominant automatic loans to employers) and indeed social democratic (universal 
earnings-related total DB pensions), albeit with a stronger ‘corporatist twist’ 
(decentralisation, private assets), and later also found itself acting as a liberal global 
portfolio investor. The Finnish pension security, however, never approached the 
liberal regime, neither did it opt for a path departure as the Swedish pension system 
did. Our study confirms two things. Firstly, the reforms in funding principles and 
investment practices can be equally related to crises in pension liabilities or PAYG 
system characteristics as much as to very specific investment paradigms. Secondly, 
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larger pension reforms should be related to both the ‘asset side’ and the ‘liability 
side’. In other words, both sides are coupled in essential similar or different ways, 
which suggests that social policy scholars looking at pension reforms must not forget 
the ‘asset side’, which should be a part of the empirical analysis in order to provide 
credible explanations for pension reforms. 
 
In the more nuanced theoretical terms used concerning governance and institutional 
change, these two cases manifest very different kinds of development paths. The main 
difference between the Swedish and Finnish institutionalisation process was in formal 
governance (see Table 6). The Swedish process led to nationally and centrally 
controlled specific forms of AP funds, whose directors were according to prevailing 
norms to be nominated mostly from labour market organisations, yet constantly open 
to political struggles. This process was characterised by the dominant powers of 
Social Democrats and LO allied in the process. The Finnish process was marked by 
stronger employer influence (main body being STK) and more party political 
fragmentation. The process led to a decentralised system, in which assets were used 
privately (although extensively regulated in terms of liability management). In terms 
of operational governance, the ways in which investments were steered had few albeit 
important differences. Both funds’ investment policies were dependent on the 
premium lending, although in lesser scale and more payment record dependently in 
Sweden. In regulative terms, the Swedish funds were directly constrained investing in 
equity whilst the Finnish funds were indirectly constrained by small reserves and 
solvency. The most important feature separating the two funds was a normative one: it 
was proper for the Swedish funds to invest in earmarked government bonds whereas 
the Finnish funds could only be used to private business projects. In discursive terms, 
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the Finnish policies have always been more risk-aware and the Swedish policies more 
profit-oriented.  
 
 The Initial Design (1960s) The Current Form (2000s) 
 Swedish AP funds 
Finnish TEL funds 
(PICs, both fund 
types) 
Swedish AP/PPM 
funds 
Finnish TyEL 
funds (PICs, both 
fund types) 
Pension 
scheme 
generating the 
assets 
National first-pillar, 
second tier, 
prefunded DB 
scheme financed by 
employers 
Decentralised 
national first pillar, 
second tier, 
prefunded DB 
scheme financed by 
employers 
National first-pillar, 
second tier, 
prefunded NDC 
scheme, personal 
accounts, financed 
by employers and 
employees 
Decentralised 
national first pillar, 
second tier, 
prefunded DB 
scheme financed by 
employers and 
employees 
Legal entities 
managing the 
scheme 
assets 
Public AP funds (3): 
public foundations 
open to political 
struggle 
 
Private entities: 
PICs, company 
pension funds, or 
industry-wide funds 
(according to 
employer selection) 
Public AP funds (6, 
including PPM 
‘default fund’) + 
private 
management (PPM) 
Private entities: 
PICs, company 
pension funds, or 
industry-wide funds 
(according to 
employer selection) 
Legal 
characteristics 
and regulatory 
sectors 
Public foundations 
(not marked-to-
market liabilities) 
Private insurance 
companies and 
book reserves 
(marked-to-market 
liabilities) 
Public foundations + 
private investment 
funds 
Private insurance 
companies 
Who controls 
Public control: 
tripartite 
representation, 
BoDs nominated by 
state 
Corporate 
governance: mild 
parity 
representation norm 
(BoDs nominated by 
supervisory boards 
on behalf of 
shareholders) 
Public selection of 
professional 
managers; Private 
managers 
Corporate 
governance: 
majority parity 
representation 
Savings 
channelled 
through 
Premium lending + 
internal and external 
(state and banks) 
management 
Premium lending 
and internal asset 
management (PICs) 
Internal and 
external portfolio 
management 
Internal and external 
portfolio 
management 
Primary 
investment 
vehicles 
Government bonds 
(74%), promissory 
loans (18%) housing 
bonds 
Premium lending 
(always >50 %), 
investment loans, 
few shares and 
housing bonds 
Domestic and 
international 
(including emerging 
countries ) equity 
and fixed-income 
Euro-Area and 
international equity 
and fixed-income; 
alternative assets 
(much variation) 
Selection 
criteria, 
mechanisms 
and 
constraints 
Automatic (premium 
lending), 
profitability, state-
led national social 
projects 
 
No equity 
investment 
Automatic (premium 
lending), 
employment  
(investment loans) 
 
No risky 
investments 
Risk and return, 
portfolio 
diversification, 
ethical screening 
 
Limited shareholder 
activism, various 
quantitative 
restrictions 
Risk and return, 
portfolio 
diversification, 
shareholder 
activism 
 
Various quantitative 
restrictions 
Primary 
investment 
goals 
 
 
Productive capital-
provision  and social 
development; the 
Rehn-Meidner plan 
Productive private 
capital for economic 
growth and 
structural change; 
private housing 
Professional 
portfolio 
management: long-
term profitability 
Professional 
portfolio 
management: long-
term system risk 
management 
Policy 
tensions 
Too high pension 
promises 
Premium loans not 
directed only to 
productive 
investments 
Low investment 
performance (i.e. 
lower pensions), 
loss of popular 
interest and support 
of PPM 
Crisis of consensual 
decision-making 
 
Table 6. The institutional design of Swedish AP and Finnish TEL funds 
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 Swedish AP funds Finnish TEL/TyEL funds 
Institutionalisation 
and Institution-
building 
Discursive drift in the old pension 
scheme 
New idea of prefunding 
Substantial bricolage 
(private sector insurance 
companies + mandatory funding) 
First Wave of 
Institutional 
Change 
Discursive layering with regulative 
translation 
(AP4: new actor and mandate) 
Normative translation 
(enforcing parity principle in 
administration) 
Second Wave of 
Institutional 
Change 
Discursive drift in pension 
sustainability 
(but legitimate investments) 
 
Normative exhaustion 
(of ATP: “Catch-22”) 
 
Regulative translation 
(NDC into ATP; new investment 
rules) and layering (redistribution 
of assets between new actors) 
Normative drift in investments 
(but legitimate liabilities) 
 
Conversion with translation 
(old purposes in new discursive 
forms, new investment rules) 
Typical Long-
term Change in 
Investment 
Governance 
Layering and drift Conversion 
 
Table 7. Institutional change processes in pension fund governance 
 
 
Our analysis suggests that there have been significant differences between these two 
ostensibly similar countries in the investment policy level over time from the 
beginning of the schemes to this day. However, it is the institutional change processes 
that tell us the most about the differences in the politics over pension assets. The 
Swedes have been more open to lengthy political struggles and thus prone to layering 
and drift, constantly adjusting the institutional arrangements, creating new ones and 
redistributing the old ones. The Finns have created extraordinarily successful path 
dependencies in which institutions either diffuse or exhaust, but have still been able to 
reform them in time whenever the latter option has emerged. The introduction of 
modern finance paradigm to the regulative framework is a prime example. The 
Swedes created new institutions and redistributed the old ones in their 1998/2001 
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reform, whilst Finns simply converted the old institutions to new purposes. The 
discursive changes from ‘real economy projects’ to financial professionalism were 
quite similar in both countries, albeit that the Finnish paradigm included also a short-
term competitivity bias in addition to the more long-term perspectives, and it was 
rather the differences in discursive frameworks of the ‘liability side’, in good 
structuration legacies in formal governance, and in the essential differences in 
investment norms that made the shift to global portfolio investments different. 
 
To end the paper it must be noted that the current politics over pension assets have 
transformed in both countries into a form that especially the Swedish policymakers of 
the early 1960s could hardly even recognize as such politics. The technocratic 
quantitative governance paradigm based on risk-return-dualisms and portfolio 
management easily raises concerns that investments have been depoliticised (De 
Goede 2004). But this is not necessarily the case. Now, the political struggles are in 
nature normative rather than regulative, and the location is the either the general 
public domain or carefully mandated special bodies that discuss what securities are 
appropriate and what aren’t. The new paradigms also manifest important differences. 
In Sweden there is an ethical council that can, albeit not necessarily too effectively, 
judge individual investments, whilst the normative framework for the Finnish 
investment selection is provider-specific. Whilst the public control and even interest 
over Swedish assets has diminished over time, the recent calls for banning hedge fund 
investments in Finnish pension investments have increased public attention and 
perhaps continued the polarisation of public opinion on appropriate investments (for 
public opinion survey, see TELA 2007). Curiously, it is the very long Finnish 
technocratic governance legacy that might cause more severe normative contestation 
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in the future, not the Swedish paradigm that has enabled political struggles over time 
but later dismantled them and given room to individual considerations in defining 
investment policy. 
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